Chapter 2:
Backdrop 1: Unpacking Key Features of Possible Worlds Needed for Analysing Cavendish
In my previous chapter, I argued that Cavendish’s writings involve an exploration of possible worlds, which she uses to illustrate her philosophical arguments. I suggested that Cavendish’s imagined scenarios function as philosophical possible worlds, rather than as creative writing, partly because there are many features which keep her imagined scenes general, hypothetical, and focused on her line of thought and argument rather than prioritizing a development of characters and plot. In a later chapter, I shall expand on how, where and why Cavendish utilises this philosophical tool in what scholarship usually assumes is merely her imaginative style of creative writing. In this chapter, I shall maintain that Cavendish enhanced her philosophy (including her ethical, political and feminist arguments) by drawing on a possible worlds-style of philosophical discussion in a very contemporary way which puts her well ahead of her time, much like I argue[i] that Lady Mary Shepherd was ahead of her time by being the first analytic philosopher (over a century later than Cavendish). This chapter aims to briefly cover an overview of the concepts and terminology within possible worlds (which, following Divers[ii], I will sometimes refer to as PW) so that some foundations are laid which can be referred back to when reading later chapters about how they apply to Cavendish’s philosophy. This both clarifies my possible worlds arguments for a specialist readership as well as making the complex, technical topic of possible worlds accessible and understandable for a non-metaphysician, non-logician or indeed non-philosopher readership.
What do I mean when I refer to a possible worlds (PW) style of philosophical discussion in the context of Cavendish’s writings?
One: The Importance of Understanding the Debating Style of Philosophical Discussion
As Divers points out, “Philosophers may mean different things by their uses of PW sentences, even on the occasions where they attain verbal agreement.”[iii] What Divers means is that even if two philosophers were to agree with each other on a particular aspect of PWs, they need not be talking about PWs in the same way. Using sentences and concepts differently can lead to talking at cross-purposes, but this does not preclude converging and agreeing about certain things. For instance, two philosophers could both be realists about possible worlds, which results in them agreeing that there is a “vast plurality”[iv] of possible worlds within which one is different. Nevertheless, they view possible worlds very differently and talk about the topic using distinctly different terms and sentences because one is a genuine realist and the other is an actualist realist. (For present purposes, I shall not complicate matters by going into the different versions of actualist realism but shall only describe the overall features of this approach to contrast it with genuine realism. As a stance, I shall take actualism to generally argue that everything that exists is actual.) An actualist realist about possible worlds says that PWs are abstract worlds which all exist actually but only one of these worlds is actualized[v]. However, genuine realists do not conceive of or talk about possible worlds in this way. In contrast, they claim possible worlds are all concrete (not abstract) and non-actual, apart from the one world which is also concrete but, unlike the other worlds, is actual and maximal (or one could think of this as the one world being termed complete)[vi]. In other words, for actualist realists, there are numerous abstract (termed abstracta in the plural ie non-physical objects eg ideas), real (termed actual) possible worlds, among which there is one, fully real (termed actualized) world, that is to say, our world. But rather than describing our world as a physical world, actualist realists tend to call it fully actualized, to explain how it’s become the real world by being the most fully actual, real world out of all the possible worlds[vii]. Whereas the genuine realists argue all worlds are physical (termed concreta to denote a plurality of concrete worlds), but they are not real, apart from our one, fully real (actualized) physical (concrete) world we live in[viii].
In the diagrammatic forms I have designed below for the genuine realist and actualist realist accounts, the genuine realist possible worlds look something like row A, where orange 3D objects depict the physical concreteness of all the worlds, and the green square hue picks out the one actualized, physical world:
Row A:
The actualist realist’s worlds, Row B, look more like this, where all the worlds are actual (all have a black border) but the possible worlds only have a black border to show they are only actual whereas the real world also has a square green hue to show it’s the only one which is actualised. The blue circles represent the abstract, non-physical worlds:
Row B:
Two: Putting Cavendish’s Possible Worlds into Context
There are many differing accounts, approaches and schools of thought about possible worlds, dating back to Ancient Philosophy. Perhaps the most well-known example of possible worlds philosophy in Cavendish’s era, the 17th century, is Leibniz. His version of possible worlds was in the context of his “philosophical theology”[ix] on evil which aimed to convince us that this actual world we live in is the best out of all the other alternatives. Nevertheless, “Few philosophers today find this statement very plausible”[x] and Cavendish’s possible world arguments clearly did not resemble his style, structure, content or theological motivations, so Leibnizian-style possible worlds are outside the scope of this book.
Moreover, until the mid-twentieth century, philosophers (arguably including Leibniz too) looked upon possible worlds as having no particular merit in its own right, it was simply a useful way of presenting other options[xi]. The present-day usage of possible worlds as a philosophical tool of explanation was most memorably announced by Kripke[xii]. On Kripke’s picture of possible worlds, they are not concrete, planet-like entities but rather counterfactual scenarios which function as alternative states or histories that could be possible for one individual[xiii]. His possible worlds explanation is based on probability in maths and is most clearly understood, I think, through his example of two dice. There are thirty-six possible results one could get from throwing the dice in every combination possible[xiv]. Kripke calls these possible outcomes states and likens them to being thirty-six possible worlds, or as he calls them, miniworlds or a set of miniature possible worlds[xv]. Just as these hypothetical probable outcomes from throwing the dice are abstract states (including the actual combination that was thrown), so possible worlds (miniworlds on a large scale) are abstract entities (not physical objects akin to the dice themselves)[xvi]. Additionally, when possible worlds are applied to an individual, I think Kripke would analyse person A having property P at world 1, and property Q at world 2. This is in contrast to theories such as David Lewis’s, who would have person A living in world 1 with property P and a person A’s counterpart (parallel person to person A) living in world 2 with property Q. Kripke’s style of possible worlds is, I suggest, especially useful when assessing one thing (be it a person, situation, state of affairs, slice of history) by hypothesising about any relevant alternative possibilities and probabilities without incurring ontological complications concerning what concretely exists and what does not. This, I argue, makes Kripke’s possible worlds a useful, analytical, philosophical tool of analysis. Thus, I suggest that aspects of Kripke’s more abstract style can be valuable when examining Cavendish’s style of imagined possible worlds which can double up as hypotheses, thought experiments, counterexamples, philosophical debating and rhetoric.
In this chapter, and more generally as an overarching argument in this volume, I suggest that the manner in which Cavendish makes use of possible worlds is closer to the 20th century, logical style (albeit with differences too) than it is to her Early Modern contemporaries. Obviously, applying 20th century symbolic logic and semantics to possible worlds is hugely different from Cavendish’s approach. Nevertheless, Cavendish seems to me to have already grasped and utilized some of the fundamental features of the present-day structure of possible worlds in that she uses them as a vehicle for exploring, explaining, analysing and academically debating counterfactual situations. This is not at odds with a creative style of writing, indeed fiction novels can create a type of alternative world[xvii].
Three: Could Book Realism and Aesthetics Inform our Understanding of Cavendish’s Possible Worlds?
One potential way of interpreting Cavendish’s writings and assessing to what extent they are possible worlds or literary fiction is, I suggest, to bear in mind a stance called Book Realism (which, like Divers, I shall be limiting to a “neutral”, “exemplary version”[xviii]). This viewpoint maintains that possible worlds are “maximal or complete stories”[xix] which are made up of analysable, actual, existing words and sentences within a “‘worldmaking’ language”[xx]. This provides “world-books”[xxi], meaning that the possible worlds take the form of a book or novel which gives us knowledge of how to assess the breadth of possible worlds and what they might be like. This appeals to both realists and anti-realists, the latter of whom use world-books as a tool for doing “certain theoretical work” without incurring potential ontological problems[xxii]. So possible worlds discourse gives philosophers a tool for generating fictitious imaginings which assist us in talking about how the real, actual world could have been otherwise. However, creative writers, I think, have the choice of constructing either a physically possible world (laws of nature which are the same as we know them now) or a purely logically possible world (hypothetically possible but would breach the laws of nature). Although this choice is also available to philosophers, for the purpose of Cavendish’s practical philosophy (feminism, ethics, political philosophy), I shall analyse her possible worlds as being definitely logically possible and also at least physically possible since Cavendish is examining arguments which are applicable to the laws of human nature, society and the real world in her various works.
Although the contemporary concern about whether possible worlds are concrete entities do not apply to Cavendish’s philosophy, David Lewis’s paper “Truth in Fiction”[xxiii], which relates possible worlds to fiction and creative writing, is especially useful when balancing and analysing Cavendish’s creative yet logical philosophical style of writing. Here, I shall merely select the pivotal concepts and arguments in Lewis’s paper[xxiv] that are particularly relevant to Cavendish’s philosophy and seemingly fictional writing. This is especially relevant if one takes on board what Lewis claims in this paper[xxv] about how truth, as well as how we talk about truth, is impacted on depending on whether it is in the context of a fictional world or the actual, real world or a different type of possible world. So, I argue, to what extent one looks upon Cavendish’s writings as philosophical or fictional affects:
· How one can begin to talk about the content of her writings, including how and if one changes approach between her texts
· What one takes to be true or not true statements in her works, and how to word one’s analysis of this
· How applicable her arguments are to the real world and society, whether one can learn from her arguments
· What philosophical weight can be given to the points she makes in her writings
Fictional stories can create a possible world which may or may not seem relevant to our lives in this world. Nevertheless, technically speaking, one needs to highlight with great accuracy how truth functions within these fictional worlds. Extending sentences about the fictional world and characters to highlight this can be helpful. For instance, when we talk about characters, plots and locations, one assumes the prefix “In such and such fiction….” X[xxvi]. This allows us to distinguish between how it is true to state the fictional location of a building in a story, but stating this fictional location does not impact on the truth of where the building is in the real world, irrespective of whether its location happens to be the same as the actual location or not[xxvii]. Such delineations also influence how we talk about the fictional characters and even how many characters there are in the story. To apply set theory style logic, one would ring-fence the fictional characters and place them in a “domain of fictional characters” with “ranges of quantification” to help describe the characters[xxviii]. However this raises the challenge of knowing exactly how many characters there should have been and whether the author or publisher included all characters the author may have intended to include or wanted to include but never did[xxix]. Lewis’s arguments about the role of storytelling I think is intriguing when applied to Cavendish. I think this storytelling concept is a potential problem if applied to Cavendish’s writings together with the assumption that she’s written pure fiction or even science fiction. This is because I suspect it introduces further implications which I think are unhelpful for interpreting her works, such as pretence[xxx] and not having to present facts which obtain in our world as we know it. Furthermore, when characters are given names, these names function differently. If their name is analysed in terms of a storyteller referring to their fictional names, then, according to Lewis[xxxi], it introduces an element of pretence that their name is, what philosophers term, an ordinary proper name and their name can only denote that character within the context of the possible world in question[xxxii]. The character’s name ceases to have the force of an ordinary proper name if extrapolated into our world we live in[xxxiii]. The categorization of fiction also means that one should adjust how one discusses the psychological[xxxiv] states of fictional characters and an examination of how far away from the actual real world the storyteller has strayed. By classifying some of Cavendish’s writings as science fiction, my concern is that it reduces their relevance to the real world, which I maintain, was not Cavendish’s intention.
Four: Further Types of Possible Worlds to Attempt to Identify in Cavendish’s Philosophy
To break down further aspects of the topic of possible worlds, it is also worth noting that contemporary philosophy further specifies “nomological modality (fixed by the laws of nature), epistemic modality (fixed by what is known) doxastic modality (fixed by what is believed) and deonic modality (fixed by what satisfies a certain norm or rule).”[xxxv]
More specifically, doxastic (from the Ancient Greek word doxa, used in epistemology to refer to belief) possible worlds are worlds which characterize a person’s set of beliefs or “actual belief system”[xxxvi]. One of these worlds may resemble the actual world if it is true of the actual world and the person holding this possible world belief rightly knew it to be factually true. Otherwise, a possible world remains merely possible, rather than actual. Similarly, a connatively[xxxvii] possible world resembles a person’s desires but, like doxastic possible worlds, they may or may not be true states or events in the actual world. In this way, the actual world is not automatically among these possible worlds, unless they are shown to represent something true of the actual world.
This gives us the following types of possible worlds[xxxviii] to attempt to identify in Cavendish’s writings:
· Nomologically possible worlds (the laws of nature are the same as those in our actual world)
· Epistemically possible worlds (broader meaning: possible knowledge within our belief system)
· Doxastically possible worlds (possibilities based on our beliefs)
· Connatively possible worlds (desirable possibilities)
· Deonically possible worlds (logically possible and fulfil ethical norms)
To clarify this terminology, I shall give a simple example I’ve thought up for each of these.
In our actual world (Wa), the law of gravity applies. So in nomological world B (WnB), a biro also falls to the floor in the way we are used to observing, due to gravity. Another example would be that certain laws of human nature apply at Wa and so we can work with the same concepts about human nature in WnB. So if we took ‘the ability to reason’ as a feature of our human nature then just as people possess reason in the actual world Wa, so people living in WnB also have the capacity to reason.
In an epistemically possible world Wepi, person A holds an overall system of beliefs. Within that system, there are possible things she knows or doesn’t know. For instance, person T’s belief system is science but within that scientific belief system, there are many scientific facts she does and doesn’t know.
In a doxastic world Wdox, person A holds the belief that P. Given P, person A formulates possibilities drawing from her belief that P. For example, person A believes that the seedling she planted will grow into a tree. Nevertheless, there are many other possibilities other than it developing into a full sized, healthy tree and for many different possible reasons or events.
In the connatively possible world Wc, I may desire chocolate. If in the actual world I do desire chocolate and maybe buy a bar then this is the real, actualised world out of all the other possible worlds. However, that there is a connative world in which I desire chocolate, does not entail that in the actual world Wa I would also desire chocolate (in which case it remains as merely a possible world) nor does it entail that I am able to find some chocolate to eat because perhaps I’m in the Scottish Highlands with only deer for company.
In deonically possible world D (Wd), ethical norms such as ‘do not murder’ apply in Wd just as they apply in Wa. This does not mean that everyone in Wd abides by this social and ethical norm, merely that the norm exists in society. Usually, worlds such as Wd are logically possible.
Five: Possible Worlds as a Philosophical Tool in Ethics
Smith, I think, rightly argues that “the contemplation of possible worlds is an essential part of ethical theorising”[xxxix] as can be seen by the topic of moral deliberation. It is worth bearing in mind that, when it comes to ethical debates (irrespective of metaphysical and ontological concerns about what a possible world is and how it exists) it is impractical to speak as though all possible worlds are actual without also accepting the notion of possibility[xl]. I agree with Smith when he maintains that morally possible worlds are presupposed and even required in order to engage in ethical thought and to convey ethical concepts and arguments in speech[xli]. I think Smith’s summary (of Borge’s view that people tend to engage in possible worlds thinking when forming intentions, trying to plan and act in the world[xlii]) reflects the dialogue and rhetoric found in Cavendish’s Orations and Bell in Campo. Much of the ethical, and indeed political and feminist arguments Cavendish makes in these texts and others, are revealed through discussions around what to do next, how to deal with a situation or war, or how people or soldiers should execute their plan of action. This often involves weighing up the options, or imagined possible worlds, to work through their ethical societal and political deliberations and values. Making use of the imaginary in no way hinders a possible worlds approach, even today. Smith captures this excellently when he points out, contra Dancy, that imaginary scenarios prompt possible worlds “analysis”[xliii]. Moreover, I agree with Smith there is great value in “intending to construct a possible world that potentially throws light on the actual world in a morally illuminating fashion”[xliv]. This, I think, fits Cavendish’s philosophy perfectly – her possible worlds are not just exploratory, they inform us about sexism, morality, politics and society in our actual world, in an enlightening way.
This style Cavendish adopts, I think, also highlights that, unlike in metaphysics for instance, there is often a gap between what ought to happen and what does happen. Just because something is immoral or amoral, it does not follow that it never happens in the (actual) world[xlv]. Therefore, another advantage of possible worlds thinking in ethics is that, according to Smith, it assists a philosopher to either disprove or assent to a purported ethical theory or argument[xlvi]. Indeed, Smith is not alone in this approach. He cites Lackey as also, contra Dancy, arguing that “moral theorists should consider fictional counterexamples”[xlvii]. Smith merely points out how, when applying possible worlds to ethics, one needs to be careful about actuality[xlviii]. Indeed, Smith claims that modality is indispensable to moral philosophy, as are possible worlds because it enables “ethical deliberation and argument in the first place” and “may secure the possibility of moral philosophy”[xlix]. I suggest that Cavendish shares this line of approach by using possible worlds as a way of deliberating and constructing ethical arguments. This is incredibly ahead for her era. There still is not much scholarship on this approach to ethics in the 21st century. So for Cavendish, writing in the 17th century, to be expounding on and showing examples of how to debate ethics and society using possible worlds is amazingly philosophically advanced and contemporary.
To conclude:
Much as these are mainly contemporary philosophical concepts and terms, I shall be applying these to Cavendish’s Early Modern practical and feminist philosophy. I shall do this by adapting these concepts of modality (namely what is and isn’t possible, necessary or contingent) where needed. This is to clearly and understandably show the technical underpinning and possible methodology behind Cavendish’s philosophy by somewhat bridging the gap between the 17th and 20th -21st centuries as well as bridging any huge subject differences, by adapting the application of these concepts. Later, I shall examine some of Cavendish’s works in turn by providing a textual analysis of where these possible world concepts and terms provide a logical framework for interpreting Cavendish’s philosophy.
[i] Liba Kaucky, Research Thoughts on...Lady Mary Shepherd, 1st ed., vol. 1, Research Thoughts On... 2 (United Kingdom: blog ebook on Blogger.com, 2018), https://theladymaryshepherdphilosophysalon.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/my-blog-ebook-research-thoughts-on-lady.html.
[ii] John Divers, Possible Worlds, Reprint, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2005).
[iii] Divers, 16.
[iv] Divers, 21–22.
[v] Divers, 21–22.
[vi] Divers, 21–22.
[vii] Divers, 21–22.
[viii] Divers, 21–22.
[ix] Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, Possible Worlds: An Introduction to Logic and Its Philosophy (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1979), xv.
[x] Bradley and Swartz, xv.
[xi] Bradley and Swartz, 63.
[xii] Bradley and Swartz, 63.
[xiii] Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, USA: Blackwell Publishers, 2010), 15.
[xiv] Kripke, 16.
[xv] Kripke, 16–18.
[xvi] Kripke, 16–18.
[xvii] Bradley and Swartz, Possible Worlds, 6.
[xviii] Divers, Possible Worlds, 179.
[xix] Divers, 178.
[xx] Divers, 179.
[xxi] Divers, 179.
[xxii] Divers, 179.
[xxiii] David Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’, in Arguing about Metaphysics, ed. Michael C. Rea, Arguing about Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2009), 78–93.
[xxiv] Lewis.
[xxv] Lewis.
[xxvi] Lewis, 79.
[xxvii] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.
[xxviii] Lewis, 78.
[xxix] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.
[xxx] Lewis, 81.
[xxxi] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.
[xxxii] Lewis, 82.
[xxxiii] Lewis, 82.
[xxxiv] Lewis, 85.
[xxxv] Divers, Possible Worlds, 4.
[xxxvi] Divers, 7.
[xxxvii] Divers, 7.
[xxxviii] Divers, Possible Worlds.
[xxxix] Benedict Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’, Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy XX, no. 3 (2001): 41.
[xl] Smith, 46.
[xli] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’.
[xlii] Smith, 43.
[xliii] Smith, 47.
[xliv] Smith, 47.
[xlv] Divers, Possible Worlds, 6.
[xlvi] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’, 47.
[xlvii] Smith, 48.
[xlviii] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’.
[xlix] Smith, 49.
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