Chapter 2: Backdrop 1: Unpacking Key Features of Possible Worlds Needed for Analysing Cavendish

Chapter 2: 

Backdrop 1: Unpacking Key Features of Possible Worlds Needed for Analysing Cavendish

In my previous chapter, I argued that Cavendish’s writings involve an exploration of possible worlds, which she uses to illustrate her philosophical arguments. I suggested that Cavendish’s imagined scenarios function as philosophical possible worlds, rather than as creative writing, partly because there are many features which keep her imagined scenes general, hypothetical, and focused on her line of thought and argument rather than prioritizing a development of characters and plot. In a later chapter, I shall expand on how, where and why Cavendish utilises this philosophical tool in what scholarship usually assumes is merely her imaginative style of creative writing. In this chapter, I shall maintain that Cavendish enhanced her philosophy (including her ethical, political and feminist arguments) by drawing on a possible worlds-style of philosophical discussion in a very contemporary way which puts her well ahead of her time, much like I argue[i] that Lady Mary Shepherd was ahead of her time by being the first analytic philosopher (over a century later than Cavendish). This chapter aims to briefly cover an overview of the concepts and terminology within possible worlds (which, following Divers[ii], I will sometimes refer to as PW) so that some foundations are laid which can be referred back to when reading later chapters about how they apply to Cavendish’s philosophy. This both clarifies my possible worlds arguments for a specialist readership as well as making the complex, technical topic of possible worlds accessible and understandable for a non-metaphysician, non-logician or indeed non-philosopher readership.

What do I mean when I refer to a possible worlds (PW) style of philosophical discussion in the context of Cavendish’s writings?

One: The Importance of Understanding the Debating Style of Philosophical Discussion

As Divers points out, “Philosophers may mean different things by their uses of PW sentences, even on the occasions where they attain verbal agreement.”[iii] What Divers means is that even if two philosophers were to agree with each other on a particular aspect of PWs, they need not be talking about PWs in the same way. Using sentences and concepts differently can lead to talking at cross-purposes, but this does not preclude converging and agreeing about certain things. For instance, two philosophers could both be realists about possible worlds, which results in them agreeing that there is a “vast plurality”[iv] of possible worlds within which one is different. Nevertheless, they view possible worlds very differently and talk about the topic using distinctly different terms and sentences because one is a genuine realist and the other is an actualist realist. (For present purposes, I shall not complicate matters by going into the different versions of actualist realism but shall only describe the overall features of this approach to contrast it with genuine realism. As a stance, I shall take actualism to generally argue that everything that exists is actual.) An actualist realist about possible worlds says that PWs are abstract worlds which all exist actually but only one of these worlds is actualized[v]. However, genuine realists do not conceive of or talk about possible worlds in this way. In contrast, they claim possible worlds are all concrete (not abstract) and non-actual, apart from the one world which is also concrete but, unlike the other worlds, is actual and maximal (or one could think of this as the one world being termed complete)[vi]. In other words, for actualist realists, there are numerous abstract (termed abstracta in the plural ie non-physical objects eg ideas), real (termed actual) possible worlds, among which there is one, fully real (termed actualized) world, that is to say, our world. But rather than describing our world as a physical world, actualist realists tend to call it fully actualized, to explain how it’s become the real world by being the most fully actual, real world out of all the possible worlds[vii]. Whereas the genuine realists argue all worlds are physical (termed concreta to denote a plurality of concrete worlds), but they are not real, apart from our one, fully real (actualized) physical (concrete) world we live in[viii].

 

In the diagrammatic forms I have designed below for the genuine realist and actualist realist accounts, the genuine realist possible worlds look something like row A, where orange 3D objects depict the physical concreteness of all the worlds, and the green square hue picks out the one actualized, physical world:   

Row A:                               

                                 

 

The actualist realist’s worlds, Row B, look more like this, where all the worlds are actual (all have a black border) but the possible worlds only have a black border to show they are only actual whereas the real world also has a square green hue to show it’s the only one which is actualised. The blue circles represent the abstract, non-physical worlds:  

Row B:

 

Two: Putting Cavendish’s Possible Worlds into Context

There are many differing accounts, approaches and schools of thought about possible worlds, dating back to Ancient Philosophy. Perhaps the most well-known example of possible worlds philosophy in Cavendish’s era, the 17^th century, is Leibniz. His version of possible worlds was in the context of his “philosophical theology”[ix] on evil which aimed to convince us that this actual world we live in is the best out of all the other alternatives. Nevertheless, “Few philosophers today find this statement very plausible”[x] and Cavendish’s possible world arguments clearly did not resemble his style, structure, content or theological motivations, so Leibnizian-style possible worlds are outside the scope of this book.

Moreover, until the mid-twentieth century, philosophers (arguably including Leibniz too) looked upon possible worlds as having no particular merit in its own right, it was simply a useful way of presenting other options[xi]. The present-day usage of possible worlds as a philosophical tool of explanation was most memorably announced by Kripke[xii]. On Kripke’s picture of possible worlds, they are not concrete, planet-like entities but rather counterfactual scenarios which function as alternative states or histories that could be possible for one individual[xiii]. His possible worlds explanation is based on probability in maths and is most clearly understood, I think, through his example of two dice. There are thirty-six possible results one could get from throwing the dice in every combination possible[xiv]. Kripke calls these possible outcomes states and likens them to being thirty-six possible worlds, or as he calls them, miniworlds or a set of miniature possible worlds[xv]. Just as these hypothetical probable outcomes from throwing the dice are abstract states (including the actual combination that was thrown), so possible worlds (miniworlds on a large scale) are abstract entities (not physical objects akin to the dice themselves)[xvi]. Additionally, when possible worlds are applied to an individual, I think Kripke would analyse person A having property P at world 1, and property Q at world 2. This is in contrast to theories such as David Lewis’s, who would have person A living in world 1 with property P and a person A’s counterpart (parallel person to person A) living in world 2 with property Q. Kripke’s style of possible worlds is, I suggest, especially useful when assessing one thing (be it a person, situation, state of affairs, slice of history) by hypothesising about any relevant alternative possibilities and probabilities without incurring ontological complications concerning what concretely exists and what does not. This, I argue, makes Kripke’s possible worlds a useful, analytical, philosophical tool of analysis. Thus, I suggest that aspects of Kripke’s more abstract style can be valuable when examining Cavendish’s style of imagined possible worlds which can double up as hypotheses, thought experiments, counterexamples, philosophical debating and rhetoric. 

In this chapter, and more generally as an overarching argument in this volume, I suggest that the manner in which Cavendish makes use of possible worlds is closer to the 20^th century, logical style (albeit with differences too) than it is to her Early Modern contemporaries. Obviously, applying 20^th century symbolic logic and semantics to possible worlds is hugely different from Cavendish’s approach. Nevertheless, Cavendish seems to me to have already grasped and utilized some of the fundamental features of the present-day structure of possible worlds in that she uses them as a vehicle for exploring, explaining, analysing and academically debating counterfactual situations. This is not at odds with a creative style of writing, indeed fiction novels can create a type of alternative world[xvii].

Three: Could Book Realism and Aesthetics Inform our Understanding of Cavendish’s Possible Worlds?

One potential way of interpreting Cavendish’s writings and assessing to what extent they are possible worlds or literary fiction is, I suggest, to bear in mind a stance called Book Realism (which, like Divers, I shall be limiting to a “neutral”, “exemplary version”[xviii]). This viewpoint maintains that possible worlds are “maximal or complete stories”[xix] which are made up of analysable, actual, existing words and sentences within a “‘worldmaking’ language”[xx]. This provides “world-books”[xxi], meaning that the possible worlds take the form of a book or novel which gives us knowledge of how to assess the breadth of possible worlds and what they might be like. This appeals to both realists and anti-realists, the latter of whom use world-books as a tool for doing “certain theoretical work” without incurring potential ontological problems[xxii]. So possible worlds discourse gives philosophers a tool for generating fictitious imaginings which assist us in talking about how the real, actual world could have been otherwise. However, creative writers, I think, have the choice of constructing either a physically possible world (laws of nature which are the same as we know them now) or a purely logically possible world (hypothetically possible but would breach the laws of nature). Although this choice is also available to philosophers, for the purpose of Cavendish’s practical philosophy (feminism, ethics, political philosophy), I shall analyse her possible worlds as being definitely logically possible and also at least physically possible since Cavendish is examining arguments which are applicable to the laws of human nature, society and the real world in her various works.

Although the contemporary concern about whether possible worlds are concrete entities do not apply to Cavendish’s philosophy, David Lewis’s paper “Truth in Fiction”[xxiii], which relates possible worlds to fiction and creative writing, is especially useful when balancing and analysing Cavendish’s creative yet logical philosophical style of writing. Here, I shall merely select the pivotal concepts and arguments in Lewis’s paper[xxiv] that are particularly relevant to Cavendish’s philosophy and seemingly fictional writing. This is especially relevant if one takes on board what Lewis claims in this paper[xxv] about how truth, as well as how we talk about truth, is impacted on depending on whether it is in the context of a fictional world or the actual, real world or a different type of possible world. So, I argue, to what extent one looks upon Cavendish’s writings as philosophical or fictional affects:

·         How one can begin to talk about the content of her writings, including how and if one changes approach between her texts

·         What one takes to be true or not true statements in her works, and how to word one’s analysis of this

·         How applicable her arguments are to the real world and society, whether one can learn from her arguments

·         What philosophical weight can be given to the points she makes in her writings

Fictional stories can create a possible world which may or may not seem relevant to our lives in this world. Nevertheless, technically speaking, one needs to highlight with great accuracy how truth functions within these fictional worlds. Extending sentences about the fictional world and characters to highlight this can be helpful. For instance, when we talk about characters, plots and locations, one assumes the prefix “In such and such fiction….” X[xxvi]. This allows us to distinguish between how it is true to state the fictional location of a building in a story, but stating this fictional location does not impact on the truth of where the building is in the real world, irrespective of whether its location happens to be the same as the actual location or not[xxvii]. Such delineations also influence how we talk about the fictional characters and even how many characters there are in the story. To apply set theory style logic, one would ring-fence the fictional characters and place them in a “domain of fictional characters” with “ranges of quantification” to help describe the characters[xxviii]. However this raises the challenge of knowing exactly how many characters there should have been and whether the author or publisher included all characters the author may have intended to include or wanted to include but never did[xxix]. Lewis’s arguments about the role of storytelling I think is intriguing when applied to Cavendish. I think this storytelling concept is a potential problem if applied to Cavendish’s writings together with the assumption that she’s written pure fiction or even science fiction. This is because I suspect it introduces further implications which I think are unhelpful for interpreting her works, such as pretence[xxx] and not having to present facts which obtain in our world as we know it. Furthermore, when characters are given names, these names function differently. If their name is analysed in terms of a storyteller referring to their fictional names, then, according to Lewis[xxxi], it introduces an element of pretence that their name is, what philosophers term, an ordinary proper name and their name can only denote that character within the context of the possible world in question[xxxii]. The character’s name ceases to have the force of an ordinary proper name if extrapolated into our world we live in[xxxiii]. The categorization of fiction also means that one should adjust how one discusses the psychological[xxxiv] states of fictional characters and an examination of how far away from the actual real world the storyteller has strayed. By classifying some of Cavendish’s writings as science fiction, my concern is that it reduces their relevance to the real world, which I maintain, was not Cavendish’s intention. 

 

Four: Further Types of Possible Worlds to Attempt to Identify in Cavendish’s Philosophy

To break down further aspects of the topic of possible worlds, it is also worth noting that contemporary philosophy further specifies “nomological modality (fixed by the laws of nature), epistemic modality (fixed by what is known) doxastic modality (fixed by what is believed) and deonic modality (fixed by what satisfies a certain norm or rule).”[xxxv]

More specifically, doxastic (from the Ancient Greek word doxa, used in epistemology to refer to belief) possible worlds are worlds which characterize a person’s set of beliefs or “actual belief system”[xxxvi]. One of these worlds may resemble the actual world if it is true of the actual world and the person holding this possible world belief rightly knew it to be factually true. Otherwise, a possible world remains merely possible, rather than actual. Similarly, a connatively[xxxvii] possible world resembles a person’s desires but, like doxastic possible worlds, they may or may not be true states or events in the actual world. In this way, the actual world is not automatically among these possible worlds, unless they are shown to represent something true of the actual world.

This gives us the following types of possible worlds[xxxviii] to attempt to identify in Cavendish’s writings:

·         Nomologically possible worlds (the laws of nature are the same as those in our actual world)

·         Epistemically possible worlds (broader meaning: possible knowledge within our belief system)

·         Doxastically possible worlds (possibilities based on our beliefs)

·         Connatively possible worlds (desirable possibilities)

·         Deonically possible worlds (logically possible and fulfil ethical norms)

To clarify this terminology, I shall give a simple example I’ve thought up for each of these.

In our actual world (Wa), the law of gravity applies. So in nomological world B (WnB), a biro also falls to the floor in the way we are used to observing, due to gravity. Another example would be that certain laws of human nature apply at Wa and so we can work with the same concepts about human nature in WnB. So if we took ‘the ability to reason’ as a feature of our human nature then just as people possess reason in the actual world Wa, so people living in WnB also have the capacity to reason.

In an epistemically possible world Wepi, person A holds an overall system of beliefs. Within that system, there are possible things she knows or doesn’t know. For instance, person T’s belief system is science but within that scientific belief system, there are many scientific facts she does and doesn’t know.

In a doxastic world Wdox, person A holds the belief that P. Given P, person A formulates possibilities drawing from her belief that P. For example, person A believes that the seedling she planted will grow into a tree. Nevertheless, there are many other possibilities other than it developing into a full sized, healthy tree and for many different possible reasons or events.   

In the connatively possible world Wc, I may desire chocolate. If in the actual world I do desire chocolate and maybe buy a bar then this is the real, actualised world out of all the other possible worlds. However, that there is a connative world in which I desire chocolate, does not entail that in the actual world Wa I would also desire chocolate (in which case it remains as merely a possible world) nor does it entail that I am able to find some chocolate to eat because perhaps I’m in the Scottish Highlands with only deer for company. 

In deonically possible world D (Wd), ethical norms such as ‘do not murder’ apply in Wd just as they apply in Wa. This does not mean that everyone in Wd abides by this social and ethical norm, merely that the norm exists in society. Usually, worlds such as Wd are logically possible. 

Five: Possible Worlds as a Philosophical Tool in Ethics

Smith, I think, rightly argues that “the contemplation of possible worlds is an essential part of ethical theorising”[xxxix] as can be seen by the topic of moral deliberation. It is worth bearing in mind that, when it comes to ethical debates (irrespective of metaphysical and ontological concerns about what a possible world is and how it exists) it is impractical to speak as though all possible worlds are actual without also accepting the notion of possibility[xl]. I agree with Smith when he maintains that morally possible worlds are presupposed and even required in order to engage in ethical thought and to convey ethical concepts and arguments in speech[xli]. I think Smith’s summary (of Borge’s view that people tend to engage in possible worlds thinking when forming intentions, trying to plan and act in the world[xlii]) reflects the dialogue and rhetoric found in Cavendish’s Orations and Bell in Campo. Much of the ethical, and indeed political and feminist arguments Cavendish makes in these texts and others, are revealed through discussions around what to do next, how to deal with a situation or war, or how people or soldiers should execute their plan of action. This often involves weighing up the options, or imagined possible worlds, to work through their ethical societal and political deliberations and values. Making use of the imaginary in no way hinders a possible worlds approach, even today. Smith captures this excellently when he points out, contra Dancy, that imaginary scenarios prompt possible worlds “analysis”[xliii]. Moreover, I agree with Smith there is great value in “intending to construct a possible world that potentially throws light on the actual world in a morally illuminating fashion”[xliv]. This, I think, fits Cavendish’s philosophy perfectly – her possible worlds are not just exploratory, they inform us about sexism, morality, politics and society in our actual world, in an enlightening way.

This style Cavendish adopts, I think, also highlights that, unlike in metaphysics for instance, there is often a gap between what ought to happen and what does happen. Just because something is immoral or amoral, it does not follow that it never happens in the (actual) world[xlv]. Therefore, another advantage of possible worlds thinking in ethics is that, according to Smith, it assists a philosopher to either disprove or assent to a purported ethical theory or argument[xlvi]. Indeed, Smith is not alone in this approach. He cites Lackey as also, contra Dancy, arguing that “moral theorists should consider fictional counterexamples”[xlvii]. Smith merely points out how, when applying possible worlds to ethics, one needs to be careful about actuality[xlviii]. Indeed, Smith claims that modality is indispensable to moral philosophy, as are possible worlds because it enables “ethical deliberation and argument in the first place” and “may secure the possibility of moral philosophy”[xlix]. I suggest that Cavendish shares this line of approach by using possible worlds as a way of deliberating and constructing ethical arguments. This is incredibly ahead for her era. There still is not much scholarship on this approach to ethics in the 21^st century. So for Cavendish, writing in the 17^th century, to be expounding on and showing examples of how to debate ethics and society using possible worlds is amazingly philosophically advanced and contemporary. 

To conclude:

Much as these are mainly contemporary philosophical concepts and terms, I shall be applying these to Cavendish’s Early Modern practical and feminist philosophy. I shall do this by adapting these concepts of modality (namely what is and isn’t possible, necessary or contingent) where needed. This is to clearly and understandably show the technical underpinning and possible methodology behind Cavendish’s philosophy by somewhat bridging the gap between the 17^th and 20^th -21^st centuries as well as bridging any huge subject differences, by adapting the application of these concepts. Later, I shall examine some of Cavendish’s works in turn by providing a textual analysis of where these possible world concepts and terms provide a logical framework for interpreting Cavendish’s philosophy.

 

 

 

---

[i] Liba Kaucky, Research Thoughts on...Lady Mary Shepherd, 1st ed., vol. 1, Research Thoughts On... 2 (United Kingdom: blog ebook on Blogger.com, 2018), https://theladymaryshepherdphilosophysalon.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/my-blog-ebook-research-thoughts-on-lady.html.

[ii] John Divers, Possible Worlds, Reprint, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2005).

[iii] Divers, 16.

[iv] Divers, 21–22.

[v] Divers, 21–22.

[vi] Divers, 21–22.

[vii] Divers, 21–22.

[viii] Divers, 21–22.

[ix] Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, Possible Worlds: An Introduction to Logic and Its Philosophy (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1979), xv.

[x] Bradley and Swartz, xv.

[xi] Bradley and Swartz, 63.

[xii] Bradley and Swartz, 63.

[xiii] Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, USA: Blackwell Publishers, 2010), 15.

[xiv] Kripke, 16.

[xv] Kripke, 16–18.

[xvi] Kripke, 16–18.

[xvii] Bradley and Swartz, Possible Worlds, 6.

[xviii] Divers, Possible Worlds, 179.

[xix] Divers, 178.

[xx] Divers, 179.

[xxi] Divers, 179.

[xxii] Divers, 179.

[xxiii] David Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’, in Arguing about Metaphysics, ed. Michael C. Rea, Arguing about Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2009), 78–93.

[xxiv] Lewis.

[xxv] Lewis.

[xxvi] Lewis, 79.

[xxvii] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.

[xxviii] Lewis, 78.

[xxix] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.

[xxx] Lewis, 81.

[xxxi] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.

[xxxii] Lewis, 82.

[xxxiii] Lewis, 82.

[xxxiv] Lewis, 85.

[xxxv] Divers, Possible Worlds, 4.

[xxxvi] Divers, 7.

[xxxvii] Divers, 7.

[xxxviii] Divers, Possible Worlds.

[xxxix] Benedict Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’, Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy XX, no. 3 (2001): 41.

[xl] Smith, 46.

[xli] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’.

[xlii] Smith, 43.

[xliii] Smith, 47.

[xliv] Smith, 47.

[xlv] Divers, Possible Worlds, 6.

[xlvi] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’, 47.

[xlvii] Smith, 48.

[xlviii] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’.

[xlix] Smith, 49.

Chapter 1: Paper Title: Margaret Cavendish: On Flourishing

 

Chapter 1

Paper Title: Margaret Cavendish: On Flourishing

Abstract

In this paper, I shall explore Margaret Cavendish’s discussions on how to live. In part one, I will address the question of how important it is to consider and talk about what constitutes the best way forward for achieving the good life. In part two of this paper, I shall ask why Cavendish adopts different stances to discuss an issue. I will then draw on these two questions to assess what we can conclude about Cavendish’s views on flourishing.

Paper

Introduction

In this paper, I explore Margaret Cavendish’s philosophical discussions on how to live, which is an aspect of my wider research project on Margaret Cavendish, which I expand on in my forthcoming book, ‘Research Thoughts on…Margaret Lucas Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle-upon-Tyne – Volume 1’[i]. Within this broad topic, for the purpose of this short paper, I shall restrict my scope to a selection of orations on peace, war, the army and gender in her ‘Orations of Divers Sort, Accommodated to Divers Places (1662) (hereafter simply referred to as ‘Orations’)[ii]. I would like to suggest that her Orations book can be interpreted in much the same way as I interpret her play ‘Bell in Campo’. That is to say, I put forward the suggestion that both can be viewed as Platonic-style philosophical dialogues which demonstrate a (sometimes feminist) thought experiment, thus they are of great philosophical and feminist significance. In this way, perhaps they could both be interpreted with the same methodological approach as they would be had they been a philosophical treatise.

I also aim to demonstrate how the topic of flourishing is the most key and fundamental concept to understanding Cavendish’s Orations. Strong textual evidence in support of this is Cavendish’s own summary at the beginning of the book, in which she even uses the word flourishing herself:

“And misery causing men to be prudent and industrious, by which they come to flourish again, at least their successors, and to show you their industry, I bring you out of the field of war into a new-built city…”[iii]

 

Part 1: How Important Is It to Consider and Discuss What Constitutes the Best Way Forward for Flourishing and Achieving the Good Life?

In this section, I will break this research question down into two sub-questions, the first question being:

Qi: Why is it important to consider and discuss topics in society?

I suggest we can cross-apply some of the arguments presented in the Scholastical Orations. The closing words[iv] of her ‘Orations’ text (oration 179) claim that study and argumentation should not leave us confused about what to think and believe. Instead, learning from argumentative debate should be used to improve our life. I think an earlier oration expands on this and captures the structure of Cavendish’s orations which argue against each other. It advocates that “arguing and disputing is a great increase of knowledge, for it distinguishes truth from falsehood, clears the understanding, quickens the wit…..”[v]. When broadened out to wider society, Cavendish shows us, through the settings and speeches, the processes taken in addition to debating among groups in society, such as scholarly groups. These range from listening to orations or delivering orations to air your stance in the marketplace, to petitioning the monarch which also involves listening to speeches or orations made by the monarch him or herself[vi]. However, this public system is male dominated and so to hear women’s orations about the social condition of women during peaceful times, we must enter a private setting. This setting is less publicly accessible, hence men and some women do not have experience of seeing or engaging with women’s debates. Cavendish redresses this gender imbalance somewhat by giving the reader a sense of what a female-led Platonic dialogue would look like. As a result, Cavendish presents a pan-societal picture showing how many different sections of society can engage in debate concerning pressing issues of the day.

The second sub-question is:

Qii: What does Cavendish think is the best way forward for achieving the good life and flourishing?

As Cavendish outlines in her opening remarks in her ‘Orations’[vii], she takes her readers on a journey from war times, battlefields and armies through to peaceful times in which society has to rebuild what has been lost during the war. As I mentioned in my introduction, I read Cavendish’s overarching argument as claiming that flourishing starts with prudence and hard work which is directed at improving life and society for yourself and others. Nevertheless, readers hear all sides of the debate from a variety of classes, professions, and ranks of army men, both during war and peace times. Cavendish’s opening claim is that people, especially men, are prone to war-mongering hence avoiding war is almost impossible, so knowing how to rebuild society in war’s aftermath is essential[viii]. She depicts this vividly by bringing to life speeches from army men who are assessing and arguing over not only their personal preferences but also the potential consequences of which course of action their army takes. By analysing these pro and contra war and peace arguments, we learn which stances lead to war and which don’t and the advantages and disadvantages that come with it. I suggest a great deal of these discussions revolve around people’s concept of the good life and human flourishing.

For example[ix], her first orations, in Part 1 of her text, immediately present a debate of the pros and cons of going to war when living in peaceful times. By Part 2, Cavendish is comparing the possible world, in which the country’s army goes to war, with how people thought about it but only futuristically, as depicted in part 1. In Part 3, we see the aftermath of war so we can now already reassess the arguments in part 1 and thus retrospectively think about the consequences of their war-mongering actions on society.

Cavendish includes issues pertaining to women’s flourishing in times of peace and shows how the issue of women’s liberty is more complex to debate productively than one may imagine. At the end of Part X, orations 127-8[x] Cavendish shows two men arguing at cross-purposes about what constitutes women’s liberty and its value. This leads us onto the following part, ‘Female Orations’ Part XI[xi], in which we hear how women themselves debate feminist issues amongst themselves. Their concept of what constitutes flourishing for women is influenced heavily by their concept of gender expectation. This makes it tricky to agree on which liberties are desirable to obtain. The woman in oration 132iv[xii] argues that women should have the freedom to “do the like exercises as men have”, “converse” everywhere that they do, otherwise women “neglect” their capabilities and shall never discover their strengths and talents. Another woman, in oration 135vii[xiii], dismisses this liberty as reducing women’s flourishing and attainment of the good life if it means they are expected to engage in dangerous work.

Gendered language and expectation also comes into the male army’s discussion of human flourishing and the good life. An example of this is the opening oration (1, Part 1) when an anti-war stance is labelled as an effeminate approach to life when downgrading that stance as both weak and undesirable[xiv]. Examples of such gendered language about human flourishing include:

“Thus peace makes men like beasts….Nay, it makes men not only live but die like beasts….”[xv]

During times of peace men’s “natures become effeminate, which makes their lives vacant, and when they die, they are buried in oblivion: for fame lives in heroic actions”[xvi] 

However, what counts as heroic is disputed with the claim (oration 2, Part 2) that there is nothing heroic or just about creating “enemies” out of people who “have done you no injury or wrong”[xvii]. This orator argues that declaring war when one could continue in peace is undesirable and foolish[xviii].

Weighing up such a variety of concepts of what flourishing consists of and how best to achieve it perhaps leaves us in a better position to form our own judgements of whether to go to war or not.

 

Part 2: Why Does Cavendish Adopt Different Stances to Discuss an Issue?

 

I suggest there are three layers (in no particular order of importance) to Cavendish’s monologue / dialogue style used effectively in her speeches / orations.

One layer is the platonic dialogue. Plato wrote dialogues comprising of two or more people who often assess human flourishing and what the good life is without Plato explicitly advocating his preferred stance on the matter[xix]. His aim was to enlarge knowledge and understanding by using philosophical techniques and methods which foster wisdom. These key features, I argue, can be identified in Cavendish’s philosophy, especially her Orations and Bell in Campo.  Like Plato, the purpose of writing a dialogue depicting a debate between people is to provide a readable philosophical forum that readers can attend at will, engage in and learn to philosophise and form their own stances, independently from the rhetorical style of others. Plato also made use of “dramatic elements”[xx] so any such features in Cavendish’s philosophy would not automatically disqualify her orations and play from being interpreted as philosophical texts.

I suggest that another similar feature between Cavendish and Plato is the technique[xxi] of using characters as vehicles for depicting the differing stances of a possible readership. I claim there is a striking parallel between Cavendish’s philosophical format and that of Plato’s. It has been said of Plato that his:

“…characters function not only to carry forward particular lines of thought but also to inspire readers to do the same—to join imaginatively in the discussion by constructing arguments and objections of their own.”[xxii]

I claim the same could be applied to Cavendish. Furthermore, Plato’s dialogues could finish in an open-ended manner with no clear solutions in much the same way as Cavendish can end her orations or speeches. 

Thus, Cavendish’s philosophy fulfils the criteria I have set out here to be classified as philosophical dialogue. Indeed, although her imagined scenarios are timeless, she nevertheless draws on classical themes. This was perhaps because classical literature and culture was common knowledge among her readership and within scholarship. The classical references add to the timeless, wise tone she wishes to set. Obviously, there are important differences too, and the Early Modern period was eager to reject the Ancient and Medieval schools of thought. However, a classical education was (and to some extent still is) part of the backbone of a strong, robust, scholarly education.      

Two, I maintain that there is a thought experiment layer to Cavendish’s philosophy. For present purposes, I take ‘thought experiment’ to mean a philosopher who constructs an imagined scenario to use as a tool to analyse situations and topics in a more flexible way than merely from limited experience, which is bound by a personal situation, such as lifestyle, gender, class and so on, which Cavendish attempted to sometimes transcend in her ‘Orations’. As Cavendish states herself, that “most of my orations are general orations, viz. such as may be spoken in any kingdom or government”[xxiii].  

The third layer is the various arguments presented in debate that function as an exploration of possible worlds. Here I am thinking more in terms of Kripke’s version of theoretical possible worlds rather than something along the lines of David Lewis and his concrete possible worlds which actually exist. The only way Cavendish’s possible worlds come close to a concrete world is when we notice that one of her imagined possible worlds is very representative of our one, actual world that we live in.

I suggest a critical way in which Cavendish’s imagined scenarios work well as thought experiments and possible worlds (as opposed to creative writing) is that there are many features which keep it general and hypothetical, helping the reader to stay focused on the line of thought and argument rather than become involved with the characters and plot. For instance, there are no character names or descriptions in orations; no action in the plot, only a philosophical assessment of life.  

Conclusion:

Drawing on these two main research questions in part 1 (including Qi and Qii) and part 2 of this paper, I think we begin to obtain a re-reading of Cavendish’s ‘Orations’ and ‘Bell in Campo’. In terms of what overarching conclusions can be drawn, I suggest that, by slotting the content of her orations together with philosophical methods and tools, we avoid the pitfall of trying to untangle the various stances and pick out which one may best represent Cavendish’s own views. I maintain that the ability to see and rationally debate all sides of an argument, whether you agree with them or not, is part of the philosophical method Cavendish is encouraging her readers to engage in. Cavendish is effectively arguing with and against herself as she writes, in order to re-create the public debates which society should be holding and giving women access to in order to be a flourishing society where its people/body politic can themselves flourish and achieve the good life. I suspect Cavendish’s own views are most explicit in her introduction so I have re-constructed her overarching claims and argument from that. She possibly appreciated how issues, especially war, are not of a one-sided nature since she had family who both won and lost at war so she was all too familiar with the consequences of supporting either war, peace or a version of either.   

---

[i] Liba Kaucky, Research Thoughts on…Margaret Lucas Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle-upon-Tyne – Volume 1, 1st ed., vol. 1 (London, United Kingdom: ebook on blogger.com, 2020).

[ii] Margaret Cavendish of Newcastle and Susan James, Political Writings, First published, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[iii] Newcastle and James, 119.

[iv] Newcastle and James, 292.

[v] Newcastle and James, 290.

[vi] Newcastle and James, Political Writings.

[vii] Newcastle and James, 119–20.

[viii] Newcastle and James, 119.

[ix] Newcastle and James, 111–71.

[x] Newcastle and James, 246–47.

[xi] Newcastle and James, 248–51.

[xii] Newcastle and James, 249.

[xiii] Newcastle and James, 250–51.

[xiv] Newcastle and James, 130–31.

[xv] Newcastle and James, 130.

[xvi] Newcastle and James, 131.

[xvii] Newcastle and James, 131.

[xviii] Newcastle and James, 132.

[xix] Constance C. Meinwald, ‘Plato: Dialogue Form’, in Encyclopædia Britannica, no date given, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Plato/Dialogue-form.

[xx] Meinwald.

[xxi] Meinwald.

[xxii] Meinwald.

[xxiii] Newcastle and James, Political Writings, 118.

My blog ebook: Research Thoughts on... Margaret Cavendish - Volume 1

Research Thoughts on…

Margaret Lucas Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle-upon-Tyne – Volume 1

Liba Kaucky

Series: Research Thoughts on…

Margaret Lucas Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle-upon-Tyne – Volume 1

Sole author: Liba Kaucky

Copyright © Liba (Libuse) Kaucky 2012-2020 (Copyright acquired automatically under UK law)

The moral rights of this author have been asserted, including:  


The Right of Attribution (eg the right of an author to be credited)

The Right to Object to Derogatory Treatment (eg affecting the author’s reputation)

The Right of Integrity (eg prejudicial distortions of the work)

The Right to Object to False Attribution

First published 2020 by Liba (Libuse) Kaucky as a blog ebook on blogger.com at The Feminist Margaret Cavendish Circle, available at:

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/

Liba Kaucky ResearcherID: P-2484-2016

URL: http://www.researcherid.com/rid/P-2484-2016  

 
Liba Kaucky ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1598-0833 

orcid.org/0000-0003-1598-0833

Academia profile: https://independent.academia.edu/LibaKaucky

Academic Website: https://libakaucky.academia.edu/

First edition.

Editor: Liba Kaucky

Cover photo: Copyright © Liba (Libuse) Kaucky (photographer) 24^th September 2013

All rights reserved. No reproduction without written permission from Liba Kaucky. No part of this blog ebook may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means now known or hereafter invented including printing, photocopying or recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from Liba Kaucky. You must not circulate this ebook in any way other than by referring people to read it on this site:

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/

Notices:

Practitioners and researchers must rely on themselves in evaluating and using any information and methods described herein and do so at their own risk. To the fullest extent of the law, the publisher, author, editor does not assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, including negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein.

Current titles in this series:

Research Thoughts on… Lady Mary Shepherd - Volume 1

Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 1

Research Thoughts on… Spinoza - Volume 2

Research Thoughts on… Spinoza – Volume 3

Forthcoming titles: 

Research Thoughts on… Lady Mary Shepherd - Volume 2

Research Thoughts on… Margaret Lucas Cavendish - Volume 2

Research Thoughts on... Spinoza - Volume 4

I would like to dedicate this book to my mother, Jana, without whose endless love, continual encouragement and support this book would not have been possible. I want to take this opportunity to thank her for always being there for me throughout life’s ups and downs and for always having total belief in me and giving me the confidence to follow my dreams. I love you!

I would also like to dedicate this book to Professor Susan James with whom I should have undertaken my UG dissertation on Cavendish. For no good reason this didn’t happen. It’s a pity we have never done research together or ever worked together. I think we’d make a good team.

Contents:

Editor's Note

Author's Note

Chapter 1: Paper Title: Margaret Cavendish: On Flourishing

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/08/chapter-1-paper-title-margaret.html 

Chapter 2:  Backdrop 1: Unpacking Key Features of Possible Worlds Needed for Analysing Cavendish

 https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/08/chapter-2-unpacking-key-features-of.html

Chapter 3:  Backdrop 2: Cavendish within a Feminist and Historical Context

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/09/chapter-3-backdrop-2-cavendish-within.html 

Chapter 4: Possible Worlds in Cavendish's Poems 

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/09/chapter-4-possibleworlds-in-cavendishs.html

Chapter 5: Possible Worlds and a Flourishing Life: A Scholarly Debate in Cavendish's Orations

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/10/chapter-5-possible-worlds-and.html

Chapter 6: Male Feminist and anti-Feminist Orations on Women in Society: How Do Men Debate What Constitutes Women's Flourishing?

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/12/chapter-6.html

Chapter 7: Women’s Feminist and anti-Feminist Orations on Women in Society: How Do Women Debate What Constitutes Women's Flourishing?

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/12/chapter-7.html

Chapter 8: Scholarly and Feminist Philosophical Debates and Dialogue in Cavendish's Orations

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/12/chapter-8.html

Concluding Remarks; Bibliography

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/2020/12/concluding-remarks-bibliography.html

Editor's Note:

The citations (in chapter 4 of this volume) from Cavendish's 1653 original edition of 'Poems and Fancies' have only been modified by changing the 17th century typeset of the letter s (which was written more like an f) to a contemporary s to make it easier to read. Any italics are retained from the original book. To read the original, see this open access book:  

Margaret Cavendish of Newcastle, Poems and Fancies (London, UK: J. Martin, and J. Allestrye at the Bell in Saint Pauls Church Yard, 1653), 

https://ia800802.us.archive.org/35/items/poemsfancies00newc/poemsfancies00newc.pdf

In this series, the following system will apply:

Orations with a capital O refers to Cavendish’s book:

orations with a lowercase o refers to individual orations within the above book

Author's Note:

The purpose of writing this ebook and publishing it on my blog is to encourage wider access and participation in philosophy and philosophical research, not just within but also outside of academic institutions regardless of educational background. This is one of the reasons I have included open access sources for Margaret Cavendish’s writings.

I can be contacted at:

Message me via: https://independent.academia.edu/LibaKaucky

or message me via my contact form on my academia website:

https://libakaucky.academia.edu/contact

Leave a comment on my blog The Feminist Margaret Cavendish Circle:

https://thefeministmargaretcavendishcircle.blogspot.com/

Introduction

This book is my first volume in a series of books I am writing on the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish, within my broader book series 'My Research Thoughts on...', which also currently features three volumes on Spinoza and one on Lady Mary Shepherd.

In this Volume 1 on Margaret Cavendish, I introduce three methodological strands to my interpretation and analysis of her writings, which also function as philosophical thought and argument techniques which convey her philosophy:

Possible Worlds

Philosophical dialogue/Rhetoric

Thought Experiments

I will closely analyse and examine specific sections of her works, with a particular focus on possible worlds and later incorporating my comparison between Plato’s style of philosophical dialogue, the querelle des femme dialogism and Cavendish’s Orations.

The main topics in this volume span Cavendish’s love of science and planetary worlds; human flourishing and how to live in order to lead the good life; why and how Cavendish presents debates and provides a variety of differing stances on issues.

My interpretation of Cavendish is what I shall refer to in full as an Intersectional, LGBT+, Classical Radical Feminist interpretation. In chapters 6 to 8, I flesh this aspect of my interpretation, building on and clarifying my previous description of my feminist interpretation of Cavendish a couple of years ago.

My overarching interpretation of Margaret Cavendish is that she was first and foremost a philosopher and mostly used creative writing as a vehicle to express her philosophical thoughts and arguments. Hence, I take a rigorously philosophical approach to interpreting all of Cavendish's works, irrespective of the apparent genre in which they are written. My overarching interpretation of Margaret Cavendish simultaneously acknowledges Cavendish as the first British, (lesbian), gender fluid, feminist philosopher. I put lesbian in brackets because so many centuries later it is especially tricky to make assumptions about sexuality. However I have included the possibility because I have read plausible theories that she should be included in LGBT+ history as a gender non-conforming lesbian. One, this is interesting to bear in mind when picturing feminism within the context of an historical timeline of women and herstory. Two, it is relevant to my interpretation of her because this impacts on how I suggest one needs to read Cavendish 's works carefully so that one does not accidentally overlook the early forms of feminism in her works or form assumptions about her feminist (or even non-feminist) intentions which may not be true on closer examination of her texts. I do not take it for granted that readers see Cavendish as the first British feminist philosopher because she is rarely, if ever, referred to as such and I have seen references to Mary Astell, Mary Wollstonecraft and others as being considered to be the first British feminists or feminist philosophers. However, Cavendish predates these women and the context of her works certainly contains no less explicit feminist issues than theirs, so it seems highly implausible to me that these women could be the first British feminist philosophers instead of Margaret Cavendish. Furthermore, Wollstonecraft's writings are not especially philosophical in style and many of her works are written with a different purpose in mind, such as documenting her travels or recording her observations during a war. Out of the British feminists who were not philosophers, one is hard pressed to find many who predate Margaret Cavendish. One I mention in this volume is Makin, however it depends on how one wishes to define 'first'. Bathsua Makin (1600-c.-1675) predates Cavendish in the sense of being born earlier but Cavendish released her feminist books earlier than her so she predates Makin in terms of her works.

What do I mean by the term feminist and what type of feminism do I have in mind? I shall not be using the option of referring to feminists in the history of philosophy as proto-feminists, simply because they predate contemporary feminist movements. This is because I feel this causes a sense of discontinuity between feminist thinkers and theories down the ages and can create the impression that feminism is a much more recent phenomenon that it actually is. Over the course of this series on Margaret Cavendish, I shall flesh out the details of how to draw parallels between contemporary feminism and Cavendish's feminist philosophy. Nevertheless, I agree that philosophers must be interpreted within the context of their era rather than being transposed into earlier or later times and movements. Thus, such comparisons are intended as a comparative analysis to situate Cavendish within feminism as a whole within a herstory of feminist philosophy as well as to enable present day feminism to draw inspiration and knowledge from Cavendish's unique approach and perspective to both philosophy and feminism. A few years back, I stated that I interpret Cavendish as a Radical Feminist. Since then, there has been an explosion of debate surrounding what Radical Feminism is and what this approach advocates, especially concerning trans people's rights. I feel that a huge amount of this public debate has generated a great deal of confusion, and sometimes misinformation or misleading arguments about what Radical Feminism is. Hence, I would like to take the time in this introduction to attempt to clarify my meanings and definitions when I examine Cavendish and feminism.

One, I shall use the term Classical Radical Feminism to distinguish what I shall refer to as Radical Feminism from Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminism (TERFs). I shall only be exploring the radical branch of feminism which has its roots in the 1960’s civil rights movement, with some feminists adding separatist elements since the 1980’s to help combat the patriarchal system, which attempt to achieve gender equality without a reliance on men’s and male feminists’ assistance. Elsewhere, I also research the male feminist J.S. Mill, and, interestingly enough, he encouraged feminist groups to be self-reliant and independent from male assistance, including from his own help at times where suitable, so a certain amount of separatism in the right way can benefit various branches of feminism. Within Classical Radical Feminism, I shall focus on the inclusive (including trans inclusive), intersectional theories within Radical Feminism. I have never, and shall not be, drawing on or supporting TERF so-called feminism or so-called pro-LGB activism. Although I see the benefits of the women’s movement being capable of functioning independently of men, I do not endorse any form of feminism which excludes people who do not wish to identify as or live with the gender identity relating to the biological sex they were assigned at birth. My personal, academic and active feminism is, and always has been, an intersectional inclusive form of feminism, which is explicitly trans inclusive. This shapes my feminist concepts and meaning behind terms which can be relevant to themes in Cavendish, such as women’s spaces and separatism, which, however, I do not use as exclusionary notions.

My opening chapter to this volume consists of my abstract and short paper, which provides an overview of my approach to my interpretation of Cavendish, my analysis and methodologies as well as to the topic of flourishing in her philosophy. In chapters two and three, I fill in background assumptions, arguments, philosophical terminology, concepts and historical context I shall be referring to later on in my interpretation. I then analyse Cavendish’s explicit mention of possible worlds and references to planetary systems in her poetry and scholarly discourse in her orations. I then test my possible worlds hypothesis and reading of her works by applying to Cavendish’s feminist orations which do not contain explicit references to possible worlds and extend the topic of flourishing into women’s flourishing, social status and rights. I conclude by demonstrating how my methodological strands are applied to Cavendish’s philosophy and flesh out Plato-style classical dialogue in her Orations.