Chapter 3: Backdrop 2: Cavendish within a Feminist and Historical Context

Chapter 3:

Backdrop 2: Cavendish within a Feminist and Historical Context 

Breaking the glass ceiling

The first book Cavendish ever published seems to be a piece of creative writing. However, her first book, ‘Poems and Fancies’[i], was supposed to comprise of a collection of her poems as well as her philosophical treatise, ‘Philosophical Fancies’[ii]. When the publisher deemed her philosophical treatise to be submitted too late for publication alongside her poems, it was printed later that year[iii]. Women academics and researchers face enough discrimination and have their work published far less than men even these days, never mind back in 1653 when Cavendish’s first publications were released, so her publications, whether treatises or those written in a more creative style, constituted a breakthrough for women. Although women wrote and some published their works, a disproportionate amount of them published anonymously, meaning they disappeared from history, and indeed herstory, more readily. This is not just because anonymous books are more likely to become invisible and forgotten but also because they are highly prone to being misattributed. Sexism in society means it is far more common for an anonymous book written by a woman to be misattributed as the work of a man than vice versa, despite men not needing to avoid discrimination by publishing anonymously as often as women. Mary Shelley was one victim of this misattribution, after publishing her first edition of Frankenstein anonymously, and despite putting her name on the second edition only three years later. Simply because her husband proofread it, this was exaggerated into claims he had co-written the book, which he did not. She was, however, hugely involved in his writings but nobody suggested she co-authored his books, although this would not have been far-fetched. Recently, there has been an outrageous suggestion that one of Mary Shepherd’s treatises (published anonymously) was actually written by James Mill, despite an historical dictionary of anonymous authors listing Shepherd as the author of the anonymous work[iv]. In my research on Shepherd[v];[vi], I see no convincing evidence in support of this claim. JS Mill (son of James Mill) and his wife Harriet also suffered from the same rumours that he had helped her with her work despite him strenuously pointing out that they worked collaboratively and seamlessly together in equal measure, especially when it came to his writings. At no point has anyone suggested that Harriet helped JS Mill, when indeed she did.

Therefore, I fully understand why writing and publishing anonymously or under a pen name did not appeal to Cavendish, especially for feminist reasons. She did not do it out of vanity or an obsession with fame for its own sake, as we see in her preface ‘To all Noble, and Worthy Ladies’:

“Condemne me not as a dishonour of your sex, for setting forth this Work for it is harmelesse and free from all dishonesty I will not say from Vanity: ….”[vii] (no page number)

(my modernisation of 17^th century typeset of the letter ‘s’ which was written more like our present day f)

Cavendish’s aim always was to become a published writer who proudly displayed her authorship in her books. She was also exceptional in that she did not use a pseudonym or hide behind a male name as George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans) did two centuries later. As Cavendish points out herself, it was a big step for her as a woman to have her poetry published since this was considered a male preserve. We can see this in her first preface ‘The Epistle Dedicatory to Sir Charles Cavendish’:

“True it is. Spinning with the Fingers is more proper to our Sexe, then studying or writing Poetry, which is the Spinning with the braine”[viii] (no page number)

In much the same way as Indie authors and Indie publishers these days, Cavendish also did a lot of the publishing and distribution work herself, on top of philosophising and writing the books:

“Cavendish was actively involved with the production of her texts as books, not only having her works printed, but also seeing her printed books bound, annotated, corrected, and deposited in public and private libraries.”[ix]

She retained her manuscripts up until the books were published and then burnt them. 

“In addition, Cavendish states that while she kept manuscript copies of her work until a book had been printed, she burned her manuscripts after printing.”[x]

Indeed, it was very common during this period for printers to dispose of authors’ manuscripts once they no longer needed it for typesetting: 

“we have no manuscript versions of any of Cavendish’s printed works. This lack of earlier manuscript versions of texts that went into print is not unusual for the early modern period (printers frequently discarded manuscripts once they had set the type)”[xi]

Nevertheless, it is just as well Cavendish stated this explicitly because stories were already circulating by the following century (18^th) that there were manuscripts of her work in Cambridge Library, until they confirmed that no such manuscripts existed there[xii]. Or anywhere else, as we can see from Cavendish’s statement! This shows how careful one must be as a researcher when stories of hidden or lost manuscripts emerge about a writer or philosopher in history. This was clearly shown by the recent shock to the academic world that some Dead Sea Scrolls fragments, discovered in the 21^st century, were found to be contemporary forgeries that had “duped outside collectors, the museum’s founder, and some of the world’s leading biblical scholars”[xiii]. Worse still, before these scrolls were uncovered as fakes, “leading scholars threw their support behind the fragments” and had already published peer approved works about it, including books, perhaps because it was a professor who declared them authentic[xiv]. It is also unfortunate that these scrolls that the independent researchers have now declared as fakes have already been published by Brill who admit they would withdraw their book if it was proved that the scrolls concerned are fakes[xv]. And it does not just stop at these fragments. Similar ones are also stored at “academic institutions around the world”[xvi]. Moreover, even if the best scenario were true and they had not been fake scrolls, they would still pose a problem because, in order to come to light in the first place, they apparently may have been stolen and or smuggled[xvii], something even an Oxford professor has been suspected of being involved in[xviii]. As Justnes points out, “But if they are authentic, unprovenanced artifacts, they must have been looted, they must have been smuggled”[xix].

Hence, given the inevitable mess and confusion that arises from contemporary discoveries of historical manuscripts, I, for one, as an independent researcher/scholar, shall steer clear of researching, writing about and publishing anything supporting or taking an interest in such discoveries (of which there are a few in my field of research, such as the Vatican manuscript of Spinoza’s Ethics and a hypothesis raised by Boyle[xx] that there may be a forgotten work by Mary Shepherd), no matter how peer reviewed and accepted the texts are and irrespective of their potential authenticity. These Dead Sea Scroll fragments demonstrate, as do the 18^th century rumours about forgotten texts by Cavendish, how fraught such a research task would be. Consequently, I would also not consider letting such discoveries influence my methodology or interpretation of any philosopher. Furthermore, I maintain that it should be a requirement that any newly discovered manuscripts should go through many years of rigorous analysis of their physical and chemical composition and cutting edge techniques, such as multispectral imaging, to determine their authenticity before researchers waste their time writing about them. For me, it also throws into doubt the practice of peer review which failed to question these scrolls early enough and the research based on them. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate the value of independent researchers!      

 

Philosophy or Creative Writing? Cavendish’s Methodological Approach 

 

Given that ‘Poems and Fancies’[xxi] was meant to be published alongside a philosophical treatise, I suggest these are deeply philosophical poems which attempt to convey arguments and thought experiments in philosophy. Cavendish was critical of how practical experiments in science were conducted. Instead of just heavily relying on practical experiments, Cavendish also advocated the method of engaging one’s reason and imagination to carry out thought experiments. She considered such theoretical, philosophical methodology, as opposed to only pure practical scientific method, to be potentially more reliable than the equipment science was using to learn about the world. Wilkins summarises it wonderfully in her paper ‘Margaret Cavendish and the Royal Society’:

“Cavendish enjoyed greater opportunities than most when it came to experimenting with the latest instruments. During their exile in Paris during the 1640s, the couple acquired an impressive collection of microscopes and telescopes, two of which were made by Torricelli, the famous Italian experimentalist, and four by Eustachio Divino, of which the largest, the ‘Great Glass’, was 29 feet long.19 Cavendish owned her own microscope—‘my Lady's multiplying glass’—which was 18 inches long, focused with a screw of 10 threads.”[xxii]

One has to bear in mind that the 17^th century scientific equipment Cavendish is referring to was very basic and had many design flaws, such as, if a lens grinder produced faulty lenses which incurred erroneous observations for the scientist then the results of the experiment would be inaccurate[xxiii]. (So the philosopher/scientist Spinoza had a very responsible job in science as a high quality lens grinder thereby ensuring scientists received and used lens that would yield accurate scientific results, as far as possible.) Cavendish’s concerns about the lack of quality control of the equipment used in many scientific experiments were justified and shared by other philosophers, namely Locke and Hobbes[xxiv]. Her main concern, as it should be for all philosophers, was a search for truth, in this case, scientific truth[xxv]. Or more precisely and historically speaking, what we now refer to as science was termed natural philosophy which spanned all three main sciences together with maths and metaphysics[xxvi].  

Cavendish’s concerns about the way scientific experiments were carried out using the equipment available in her day extended to experiments performed at the Royal Society (academy for sciences). The Royal Society invited her to a meeting of theirs (the first woman to be thus invited) during which members demonstrated some scientific experiments for her to observe, including contras to her stances, for instance, on vacuums. Cavendish must have been extremely knowledgeable to cope with these rebuttals coming from so-called learned men! A fellow feminist in her era, Bathsua Makin (1600-c. 1675) was not only supportive of Cavendish but even declared her to be better at science than the male university graduates[xxvii]. So when reading Cavendish it is important to bear in mind that, like Spinoza, she was both a philosopher and a scientist. They were also both very creative people. Spinoza was an artist and Cavendish a literary figure. Makin’s views on women’s educational abilities in general led to her setting up a school for girls and distributing the women’s education pamphlet "An Essay to Revive the Ancient Education of Gentlewomen’. She published a treatise on this subject the year Cavendish died titled ‘An Essay To Revive the Ancient Education of Gentlewomen, in Religion, Manners, Arts & Tongues, with an Answer to the Objections against this Way of Education’ (1673). Makin’s views were then repeated by Mary Astell not long after (1666 – 1731). Makin[xxviii] considered Cavendish to be one of the most educated and intelligent women in history, alongside Arete of Cyrene, who was venerated in her day (4^th-5^th century BCE, North Africa) and argued for gender and racial equality, taking a stand against slavery[xxix]. This is amazing given she lived so far back in history. We assume that back then, things were so dire that women just sat at home and spun while slavery was so entrenched as a societal norm that nobody questioned it until centuries later. In addition, Arete worked as a philosopher, led the Cyrenaic School of Philosophy, trained around 110 Philosophy students and wrote 40 books[xxx]. Many still assume women only became philosophers until relatively recently but Arete shows, as do the Jewish women philosophers of Alexandria[xxxi], that herstory tells us otherwise. Since Makin referred to Arete in her treatise on women’s education, it is highly plausible that Cavendish was also aware of her, especially since Makin and Cavendish belong to the same era, both were educated women feminists and knew of each other. So perhaps Arete was a role model for Cavendish, as perhaps, I think, was Christine de Pizan (née Cristina da Pizzano, 1364 – circa 1430). Both Cavendish and Pizan were part of court life, albeit in different ways, and spent time living in France. They were both prolific writers who not only wrote poetry but also dealt with the theme of war and the military. This is an unusual combination of writing interests that they had in common. Cavendish was also widely read because she had tutors and access to a scholarly library from a young age. In addition, one of her brothers (John) was a scholar who was highly educated in philosophy, natural science, as well as all three Ancient languages and became a founding member of the Royal Society. (He was also a soldier and Royalist Commander in the English Civil War.) This means that Cavendish was used to academic debate, dialogue and contras from intellectual discussions with him especially given it was part of her home environment. So I think it is possible she was mostly academically inspired by her brother [rather than by academic discussions later as an adult with her husband (MP) and his brother (mathematican and MP)] alongside perhaps wishing to emulate strong, intellectual women  in history, such as Arete and Pizan. Hence, we can see that Cavendish is, in fact, very much in the tradition of intellectual women down the ages. She is not some bizarre, freak of nature who is an aberration in the history of philosophy. On the contrary, she built on and developed the history of women in philosophy with the same style and strength of those who came before her.  

Furthermore, even in modern times when scientific equipment and research is much more advanced, Cavendish’s rational, thought experiment approach still has merit, especially when it comes to making new discoveries. Einstein is one example of a scientist who used philosophical reasoning coupled with imagination for constructing theories which have stood the test of time and have yet to be disproved by fellow present day scientists, especially his Theory of General Relativity:

“He liked to think visually, coming up with experiments in his mind’s eye and working them around in his head until he could see the ideas and physical principles with crystalline clarity.”[xxxii]

“…Einstein got started on his thought experiments when he was just 16, and.. it eventually led him to the most revolutionary equation in modern physics.”[xxxiii]

Hence, given the various arguments I have presented above, I shall explore the possibility of Cavendish using literary devices as a vehicle for her imaginative and rational philosophical methodological approach, rather than for creative writing purposes in themselves. In this volume, I shall begin to explore in depth my overall hypothesis that Cavendish’s creative writing was mainly a vehicle for her to publish her philosophy. Although Cavendish was creative and innovative, I suggest her main aim, in perhaps all of her books, was to convey her philosophical knowledge, theories and arguments to readers.

 

Criticisms which Hinder an Understanding of Her Texts

In this section, I wish to discuss criticisms (of which there were many) aimed at Cavendish’s writings which, I think, hinder reading, understanding and appreciating her texts.

Cavendish’s Style of Writing

Cavendish is often criticised for her spelling and for her seemingly rudimentary poetic and creative writing style. However, her spelling is of her era and is perfectly understandable. After all, if we look at Shakespeare, we do not see modern spelling or modern grammar but nobody suggests he could not spell or write English! A further example of a similar style of writing, in Cavendish’s era, is Countess Mary Sidney (Herbert) whose works are written with very similar spelling and rhyming to Cavendish. Countess Mary Sidney (Herbert) was a literary figure who died (1621) only two years before Cavendish was born (1623). It is likely Cavendish would have read Sidney’s works especially since they were both of the same class and Cavendish was supportive of women becoming writers. According to Robin Williams, Sidney may well have been the woman behind Shakespeare’s (1564-1616) plays and sonnets and was “a woman at the forefront of the literary movement in Elizabethan England, yet forbidden to write for the stage because of her gender”[xxxiv].

For example, the opening verse of ‘The Dolefull Lay of Clorinda’ (1595): 

“AY me, to whom shall I my case complaine?

That may compassion my impatient griefe?

Or where shall I unfold my inward paine,

That my enriuen heart may find reliefe?

Shall I vnto the heauenly powres it show?                        

Or unto earthly men that dwell below?”[xxxv]

I’m aware that Sidney is rhyming lines 1&3, 2&4, 5&6 whereas Cavendish favours rhyming in couplets[xxxvi]. Nothing unusual or pedantic about this, given that a famous male poet/s (Jonson or Browne) wrote a poetic epitaph[xxxvii] in honour of Mary Sidney on her death, written in the same rhyming couplet style as Cavendish herself employed:

“Underneath this sable hearse

Lies the subject of all verse,

Sidney's sister, Pembroke's mother;

Death, ere thou hast slain another

Fair and learned and good as she,

Time shall throw a dart at thee.

Marble piles let no man raise

To her name, for after-days

Some kind woman, born as she,

Reading this, like Niobe

Shall turn marble, and become

Both her mourner and her tomb.”[xxxviii]

So it is not a facile style and hence such criticisms are unwarranted, flawed and plain wrong. This includes Virginia Woolf’s essay ‘The Duchess of Newcastle’ in her collection ‘The Common Reader First Series’ (1925)[xxxix] in which she attempts to dehumanise and demolish Cavendish as a person as well as her life’s work, both her philosophy and her literary works:

“Naturally, then, her language was coarse. Nevertheless, though her philosophies are futile, and her plays intolerable, and her verses mainly dull, the vast bulk of the Duchess is leavened by a vein of authentic fire. One cannot help following the lure of her erratic and lovable personality as it meanders and twinkles through page after page. There is something noble and Quixotic and high-spirited, as well as crack-brained and bird-witted, about her. Her simplicity is so open; her intelligence so active; her sympathy with fairies and animals so true and tender. She has the freakishness of an elf, the irresponsibility of some non-human creature, its heartlessness, and its charm.”[xl]

What an unpleasant read! None of the other essays[xli] are as scathing about anyone, be it George Eliot, the Brontes, Jane Austen or Archbishop Thomson, amongst others. And this tirade[xlii] is ironic given that Woolf is considered to be at the forefront of 20^th century feminism and emphasized that women should be free to follow their life’s ambitions and dreams without worrying about other people’s criticism. Yet Woolf is denigrating Cavendish[xliii] for doing precisely that which she is advocating that women should do. Furthermore, it shows incredible ignorance, disregard and disrespect on the part of Woolf that she has no feminist interest in how Cavendish broke through the glass ceiling of the publishing, philosophical and literary worlds of the 17^th century yet is happy to benefit from her advancements for women by becoming a famous, published writer herself. 

Moreover, if there are inconsistencies and inaccuracies in Cavendish’s writings, these are mainly down to her publishers and printers mistyping her manuscript. She was forever engaged in correcting their errors.[xliv]   

Cavendish’s Supposed Atheism

A further criticism levelled at Cavendish, which she had to correct in writing, was that she was an atheist. This was a serious problem for anyone during the Early Modern period in various countries. In England, Cavendish was writing in the years leading up to the introduction of a Bill (1666) against atheism, especially in books. In her ‘Physical Opinions’[xlv], Cavendish is very clear in one of her epistles to her readers that on no account is she an atheist:

“Desire my Readers to give me the same priviledge to discourse in natural Philosophy, as Scholers have in schooles, which I have heard speak freely, and boldly, without being condemned for Atheisme; for they speak as natural Philosophers, not as Divines: and since it is natural Philosophy, and not Theologie, I treat on, pray account me not an Atheist, but beleeve as I do in God Almighty.”[xlvi] (no page number)

Misunderstanding Cavendish as being an atheist leads to misinterpreting her philosophy. The same can be said of Spinoza who had to put up with similar misunderstanding (within the same century) which he kept attempting to correct. Lady Mary Shepherd may well have had the same problem, for one of the same reasons that, like Spinoza and Cavendish, she wished to keep philosophy and theology as separate fields. This is exactly right. Philosophy and theology have very different methodologies, priorities, ways of thinking and structure of argumentation. Not forgetting that their use of logic has some differences, most strikingly, that theological arguments are allowed to become more circular in order to support the inevitable conclusion that God exists. Philosophy is more open ended in its search for truth and no logical, rational conclusion is dismissed. It is also not judged in relation to religious dogma. In this way, conflating the two creates confusion and encourages a battle between the two which does not do either discipline any favours. Both disciplines and their respective methodologies are weakened by attempts to merge the two into a hybrid discipline. This, I maintain, is as much of a mistake today as it ever was. It does not follow that a philosopher who keeps the two disciplines separate is atheistic, agnostic, or indifferent. Indeed, all three philosophers saw themselves as religious believers.                    

 

---

[i] Margaret Cavendish of Newcastle, Poems and Fancies (London, UK: J. Martin, and J. Allestrye at the Bell in Saint Pauls Church Yard, 1653), https://ia800802.us.archive.org/35/items/poemsfancies00newc/poemsfancies00newc.pdf.

[ii] Margaret Cavendish of Newcastle, PHILOSOPHICALL FANCIES (London UK: J. Martin, and J. Allestrye, at the Bell in St. Pauls Church-yard, 1653), http://tei.it.ox.ac.uk/tcp/Texts-HTML/free/A53/A53057.html.

[iii] Eugene Marshall, ‘Margaret Cavendish (1623—1673)’, in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n/d, https://iep.utm.edu/cavend-m/.

[iv] Deborah Boyle, ‘A Mistaken Attribution to Lady Mary Shepherd’, Journal of Modern Philosophy 2, no. 1 (1 June 2020), https://doi.org/10.32881/jomp.100.

[v] Liba Kaucky, Research Thoughts on...Lady Mary Shepherd, 1st ed., vol. 1, Research Thoughts On... 2 (United Kingdom: blog ebook on Blogger.com, 2018), https://theladymaryshepherdphilosophysalon.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/my-blog-ebook-research-thoughts-on-lady.html.

[vi] Liba Kaucky, Research Thoughts on...Lady Mary Shepherd, 1st ed., vol. 2, Research Thoughts On... 2 (London UK: ebook on blogger.com, forthcoming), https://theladymaryshepherdphilosophysalon.blogspot.com/2019/01/my-blog-ebook-research-thoughts-on-lady.html.

[vii] Newcastle, Poems and Fancies.

[viii] Newcastle.

[ix] Liza Blake, ‘Textual and Editorial Introduction’, in Margaret Cavendish’s Poems and Fancies: A Digital Critical Edition., ed. Liza Blake (Toronto, Canada: Powered by Wordpress, 2019), http://library2.utm.utoronto.ca/poemsandfancies/textual-and-editorial-introduction/.

[x] Blake.

[xi] Blake.

[xii] Blake.

[xiii] Michael Greshko, ‘Exclusive: “Dead Sea Scrolls” at the Museum of the Bible Are All Forgeries’, National Geographic, 13 March 2020, Exclusive: ‘Dead Sea Scrolls’ at the Museum of the Bible are all forgeries.

[xiv] Greshko.

[xv] Greshko.

[xvi] Greshko.

[xvii] Arstein Justnes and Josephine Munch Rasmussen, ‘Soli Deo Gloria? The Scholars, the Market, and the Dubious  Post-2002 Dead Sea Scrolls-like Fragments’, November 2017, https://www.academia.edu/35155496/_Soli_Deo_Gloria_The_Scholars_the_Market_and_the_Dubious_Post_2002_Dead_Sea_Scrolls_like_Fragments_Bible_and_Interpretation_November_2017_.

[xviii] Greshko, ‘Exclusive: “Dead Sea Scrolls” at the Museum of the Bible Are All Forgeries’.

[xix] Greshko.

[xx] Boyle, ‘A Mistaken Attribution to Lady Mary Shepherd’.

[xxi] Newcastle, Poems and Fancies.

[xxii] Emma Wilkins, ‘Margaret Cavendish and the Royal Society’, Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science 68, no. 3 (20 September 2014): 247, https://doi.org/10.1098/rsnr.2014.0015.

[xxiii] Wilkins, 247–48.

[xxiv] Wilkins, 248–49.

[xxv] Wilkins, ‘Margaret Cavendish and the Royal Society’.

[xxvi] Wilkins, 256; note 2.

[xxvii] Bathsua Makin, AN ESSAY To Revive the Ancient Education of Gentlewomen, in Religion, Manners, Arts & Tongues. With An Answer to the Objections against This Way of Education. (London UK: Printed by J. D. to be sold by Tho. Parkhurst, at the Bible and Crown at the lower end of Cheapside, 1673), http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/makin/education/education.html.

[xxviii] Makin.

[xxix] None given, ‘Arete of Cyrene’, in Encyclopedia.com (Encyclopedia.com, September 2020), https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/arete-cyrene.

[xxx] None given.

[xxxi] Joan E. Taylor, Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria: Philo’s ‘Therapeutae’ Reconsidered, Reprinted (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009).

[xxxii] Mitch Waldrop, ‘Einstein’s Relativity Explained in 4 Simple Steps’, National Geographic, 16 May 2017, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2017/05/einstein-relativity-thought-experiment-train-lightning-genius/.

[xxxiii] Waldrop.

[xxxiv] Robin Williams, Sweet Swan of Avon: Did a Woman Write Shakespeare? (Berkeley, CA: Wilton Circle Press, 2006).

[xxxv] Mary Herbert, Countess of Pembroke, ‘The Dolefull Lay of Clorinda’, Educational, Luminarium, 1595, http://www.luminarium.org/renlit/dolefull.htm.

[xxxvi] Newcastle, Poems and Fancies.

[xxxvii] William Browne, ‘On the Countess Dowager of Pembroke’, Educational, www.web-books.com, 1621, http://www.web-books.com/Classics/Poetry/Anthology/Browne/OnCountess.htm.

[xxxviii] Browne.

[xxxix] Virginia Woolf, The Common Reader., 1st ed., 1925, http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks03/0300031h.html#C06.

[xl] Woolf.

[xli] Woolf.

[xlii] Woolf.

[xliii] Woolf.

[xliv] Blake, ‘Textual and Editorial Introduction’.

[xlv] Margaret Cavendish of Newcastle, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND Physical Opinions (London UK: J. Martin, and J. Allestrye at the Bell in Saint Pauls Church Yard in 1655; Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership in 2011, 1655), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A53055.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext.

[xlvi] Newcastle.

Chapter 2: Backdrop 1: Unpacking Key Features of Possible Worlds Needed for Analysing Cavendish

Chapter 2: 

Backdrop 1: Unpacking Key Features of Possible Worlds Needed for Analysing Cavendish

In my previous chapter, I argued that Cavendish’s writings involve an exploration of possible worlds, which she uses to illustrate her philosophical arguments. I suggested that Cavendish’s imagined scenarios function as philosophical possible worlds, rather than as creative writing, partly because there are many features which keep her imagined scenes general, hypothetical, and focused on her line of thought and argument rather than prioritizing a development of characters and plot. In a later chapter, I shall expand on how, where and why Cavendish utilises this philosophical tool in what scholarship usually assumes is merely her imaginative style of creative writing. In this chapter, I shall maintain that Cavendish enhanced her philosophy (including her ethical, political and feminist arguments) by drawing on a possible worlds-style of philosophical discussion in a very contemporary way which puts her well ahead of her time, much like I argue[i] that Lady Mary Shepherd was ahead of her time by being the first analytic philosopher (over a century later than Cavendish). This chapter aims to briefly cover an overview of the concepts and terminology within possible worlds (which, following Divers[ii], I will sometimes refer to as PW) so that some foundations are laid which can be referred back to when reading later chapters about how they apply to Cavendish’s philosophy. This both clarifies my possible worlds arguments for a specialist readership as well as making the complex, technical topic of possible worlds accessible and understandable for a non-metaphysician, non-logician or indeed non-philosopher readership.

What do I mean when I refer to a possible worlds (PW) style of philosophical discussion in the context of Cavendish’s writings?

One: The Importance of Understanding the Debating Style of Philosophical Discussion

As Divers points out, “Philosophers may mean different things by their uses of PW sentences, even on the occasions where they attain verbal agreement.”[iii] What Divers means is that even if two philosophers were to agree with each other on a particular aspect of PWs, they need not be talking about PWs in the same way. Using sentences and concepts differently can lead to talking at cross-purposes, but this does not preclude converging and agreeing about certain things. For instance, two philosophers could both be realists about possible worlds, which results in them agreeing that there is a “vast plurality”[iv] of possible worlds within which one is different. Nevertheless, they view possible worlds very differently and talk about the topic using distinctly different terms and sentences because one is a genuine realist and the other is an actualist realist. (For present purposes, I shall not complicate matters by going into the different versions of actualist realism but shall only describe the overall features of this approach to contrast it with genuine realism. As a stance, I shall take actualism to generally argue that everything that exists is actual.) An actualist realist about possible worlds says that PWs are abstract worlds which all exist actually but only one of these worlds is actualized[v]. However, genuine realists do not conceive of or talk about possible worlds in this way. In contrast, they claim possible worlds are all concrete (not abstract) and non-actual, apart from the one world which is also concrete but, unlike the other worlds, is actual and maximal (or one could think of this as the one world being termed complete)[vi]. In other words, for actualist realists, there are numerous abstract (termed abstracta in the plural ie non-physical objects eg ideas), real (termed actual) possible worlds, among which there is one, fully real (termed actualized) world, that is to say, our world. But rather than describing our world as a physical world, actualist realists tend to call it fully actualized, to explain how it’s become the real world by being the most fully actual, real world out of all the possible worlds[vii]. Whereas the genuine realists argue all worlds are physical (termed concreta to denote a plurality of concrete worlds), but they are not real, apart from our one, fully real (actualized) physical (concrete) world we live in[viii].

 

In the diagrammatic forms I have designed below for the genuine realist and actualist realist accounts, the genuine realist possible worlds look something like row A, where orange 3D objects depict the physical concreteness of all the worlds, and the green square hue picks out the one actualized, physical world:   

Row A:                               

                                 

 

The actualist realist’s worlds, Row B, look more like this, where all the worlds are actual (all have a black border) but the possible worlds only have a black border to show they are only actual whereas the real world also has a square green hue to show it’s the only one which is actualised. The blue circles represent the abstract, non-physical worlds:  

Row B:

 

Two: Putting Cavendish’s Possible Worlds into Context

There are many differing accounts, approaches and schools of thought about possible worlds, dating back to Ancient Philosophy. Perhaps the most well-known example of possible worlds philosophy in Cavendish’s era, the 17^th century, is Leibniz. His version of possible worlds was in the context of his “philosophical theology”[ix] on evil which aimed to convince us that this actual world we live in is the best out of all the other alternatives. Nevertheless, “Few philosophers today find this statement very plausible”[x] and Cavendish’s possible world arguments clearly did not resemble his style, structure, content or theological motivations, so Leibnizian-style possible worlds are outside the scope of this book.

Moreover, until the mid-twentieth century, philosophers (arguably including Leibniz too) looked upon possible worlds as having no particular merit in its own right, it was simply a useful way of presenting other options[xi]. The present-day usage of possible worlds as a philosophical tool of explanation was most memorably announced by Kripke[xii]. On Kripke’s picture of possible worlds, they are not concrete, planet-like entities but rather counterfactual scenarios which function as alternative states or histories that could be possible for one individual[xiii]. His possible worlds explanation is based on probability in maths and is most clearly understood, I think, through his example of two dice. There are thirty-six possible results one could get from throwing the dice in every combination possible[xiv]. Kripke calls these possible outcomes states and likens them to being thirty-six possible worlds, or as he calls them, miniworlds or a set of miniature possible worlds[xv]. Just as these hypothetical probable outcomes from throwing the dice are abstract states (including the actual combination that was thrown), so possible worlds (miniworlds on a large scale) are abstract entities (not physical objects akin to the dice themselves)[xvi]. Additionally, when possible worlds are applied to an individual, I think Kripke would analyse person A having property P at world 1, and property Q at world 2. This is in contrast to theories such as David Lewis’s, who would have person A living in world 1 with property P and a person A’s counterpart (parallel person to person A) living in world 2 with property Q. Kripke’s style of possible worlds is, I suggest, especially useful when assessing one thing (be it a person, situation, state of affairs, slice of history) by hypothesising about any relevant alternative possibilities and probabilities without incurring ontological complications concerning what concretely exists and what does not. This, I argue, makes Kripke’s possible worlds a useful, analytical, philosophical tool of analysis. Thus, I suggest that aspects of Kripke’s more abstract style can be valuable when examining Cavendish’s style of imagined possible worlds which can double up as hypotheses, thought experiments, counterexamples, philosophical debating and rhetoric. 

In this chapter, and more generally as an overarching argument in this volume, I suggest that the manner in which Cavendish makes use of possible worlds is closer to the 20^th century, logical style (albeit with differences too) than it is to her Early Modern contemporaries. Obviously, applying 20^th century symbolic logic and semantics to possible worlds is hugely different from Cavendish’s approach. Nevertheless, Cavendish seems to me to have already grasped and utilized some of the fundamental features of the present-day structure of possible worlds in that she uses them as a vehicle for exploring, explaining, analysing and academically debating counterfactual situations. This is not at odds with a creative style of writing, indeed fiction novels can create a type of alternative world[xvii].

Three: Could Book Realism and Aesthetics Inform our Understanding of Cavendish’s Possible Worlds?

One potential way of interpreting Cavendish’s writings and assessing to what extent they are possible worlds or literary fiction is, I suggest, to bear in mind a stance called Book Realism (which, like Divers, I shall be limiting to a “neutral”, “exemplary version”[xviii]). This viewpoint maintains that possible worlds are “maximal or complete stories”[xix] which are made up of analysable, actual, existing words and sentences within a “‘worldmaking’ language”[xx]. This provides “world-books”[xxi], meaning that the possible worlds take the form of a book or novel which gives us knowledge of how to assess the breadth of possible worlds and what they might be like. This appeals to both realists and anti-realists, the latter of whom use world-books as a tool for doing “certain theoretical work” without incurring potential ontological problems[xxii]. So possible worlds discourse gives philosophers a tool for generating fictitious imaginings which assist us in talking about how the real, actual world could have been otherwise. However, creative writers, I think, have the choice of constructing either a physically possible world (laws of nature which are the same as we know them now) or a purely logically possible world (hypothetically possible but would breach the laws of nature). Although this choice is also available to philosophers, for the purpose of Cavendish’s practical philosophy (feminism, ethics, political philosophy), I shall analyse her possible worlds as being definitely logically possible and also at least physically possible since Cavendish is examining arguments which are applicable to the laws of human nature, society and the real world in her various works.

Although the contemporary concern about whether possible worlds are concrete entities do not apply to Cavendish’s philosophy, David Lewis’s paper “Truth in Fiction”[xxiii], which relates possible worlds to fiction and creative writing, is especially useful when balancing and analysing Cavendish’s creative yet logical philosophical style of writing. Here, I shall merely select the pivotal concepts and arguments in Lewis’s paper[xxiv] that are particularly relevant to Cavendish’s philosophy and seemingly fictional writing. This is especially relevant if one takes on board what Lewis claims in this paper[xxv] about how truth, as well as how we talk about truth, is impacted on depending on whether it is in the context of a fictional world or the actual, real world or a different type of possible world. So, I argue, to what extent one looks upon Cavendish’s writings as philosophical or fictional affects:

·         How one can begin to talk about the content of her writings, including how and if one changes approach between her texts

·         What one takes to be true or not true statements in her works, and how to word one’s analysis of this

·         How applicable her arguments are to the real world and society, whether one can learn from her arguments

·         What philosophical weight can be given to the points she makes in her writings

Fictional stories can create a possible world which may or may not seem relevant to our lives in this world. Nevertheless, technically speaking, one needs to highlight with great accuracy how truth functions within these fictional worlds. Extending sentences about the fictional world and characters to highlight this can be helpful. For instance, when we talk about characters, plots and locations, one assumes the prefix “In such and such fiction….” X[xxvi]. This allows us to distinguish between how it is true to state the fictional location of a building in a story, but stating this fictional location does not impact on the truth of where the building is in the real world, irrespective of whether its location happens to be the same as the actual location or not[xxvii]. Such delineations also influence how we talk about the fictional characters and even how many characters there are in the story. To apply set theory style logic, one would ring-fence the fictional characters and place them in a “domain of fictional characters” with “ranges of quantification” to help describe the characters[xxviii]. However this raises the challenge of knowing exactly how many characters there should have been and whether the author or publisher included all characters the author may have intended to include or wanted to include but never did[xxix]. Lewis’s arguments about the role of storytelling I think is intriguing when applied to Cavendish. I think this storytelling concept is a potential problem if applied to Cavendish’s writings together with the assumption that she’s written pure fiction or even science fiction. This is because I suspect it introduces further implications which I think are unhelpful for interpreting her works, such as pretence[xxx] and not having to present facts which obtain in our world as we know it. Furthermore, when characters are given names, these names function differently. If their name is analysed in terms of a storyteller referring to their fictional names, then, according to Lewis[xxxi], it introduces an element of pretence that their name is, what philosophers term, an ordinary proper name and their name can only denote that character within the context of the possible world in question[xxxii]. The character’s name ceases to have the force of an ordinary proper name if extrapolated into our world we live in[xxxiii]. The categorization of fiction also means that one should adjust how one discusses the psychological[xxxiv] states of fictional characters and an examination of how far away from the actual real world the storyteller has strayed. By classifying some of Cavendish’s writings as science fiction, my concern is that it reduces their relevance to the real world, which I maintain, was not Cavendish’s intention. 

 

Four: Further Types of Possible Worlds to Attempt to Identify in Cavendish’s Philosophy

To break down further aspects of the topic of possible worlds, it is also worth noting that contemporary philosophy further specifies “nomological modality (fixed by the laws of nature), epistemic modality (fixed by what is known) doxastic modality (fixed by what is believed) and deonic modality (fixed by what satisfies a certain norm or rule).”[xxxv]

More specifically, doxastic (from the Ancient Greek word doxa, used in epistemology to refer to belief) possible worlds are worlds which characterize a person’s set of beliefs or “actual belief system”[xxxvi]. One of these worlds may resemble the actual world if it is true of the actual world and the person holding this possible world belief rightly knew it to be factually true. Otherwise, a possible world remains merely possible, rather than actual. Similarly, a connatively[xxxvii] possible world resembles a person’s desires but, like doxastic possible worlds, they may or may not be true states or events in the actual world. In this way, the actual world is not automatically among these possible worlds, unless they are shown to represent something true of the actual world.

This gives us the following types of possible worlds[xxxviii] to attempt to identify in Cavendish’s writings:

·         Nomologically possible worlds (the laws of nature are the same as those in our actual world)

·         Epistemically possible worlds (broader meaning: possible knowledge within our belief system)

·         Doxastically possible worlds (possibilities based on our beliefs)

·         Connatively possible worlds (desirable possibilities)

·         Deonically possible worlds (logically possible and fulfil ethical norms)

To clarify this terminology, I shall give a simple example I’ve thought up for each of these.

In our actual world (Wa), the law of gravity applies. So in nomological world B (WnB), a biro also falls to the floor in the way we are used to observing, due to gravity. Another example would be that certain laws of human nature apply at Wa and so we can work with the same concepts about human nature in WnB. So if we took ‘the ability to reason’ as a feature of our human nature then just as people possess reason in the actual world Wa, so people living in WnB also have the capacity to reason.

In an epistemically possible world Wepi, person A holds an overall system of beliefs. Within that system, there are possible things she knows or doesn’t know. For instance, person T’s belief system is science but within that scientific belief system, there are many scientific facts she does and doesn’t know.

In a doxastic world Wdox, person A holds the belief that P. Given P, person A formulates possibilities drawing from her belief that P. For example, person A believes that the seedling she planted will grow into a tree. Nevertheless, there are many other possibilities other than it developing into a full sized, healthy tree and for many different possible reasons or events.   

In the connatively possible world Wc, I may desire chocolate. If in the actual world I do desire chocolate and maybe buy a bar then this is the real, actualised world out of all the other possible worlds. However, that there is a connative world in which I desire chocolate, does not entail that in the actual world Wa I would also desire chocolate (in which case it remains as merely a possible world) nor does it entail that I am able to find some chocolate to eat because perhaps I’m in the Scottish Highlands with only deer for company. 

In deonically possible world D (Wd), ethical norms such as ‘do not murder’ apply in Wd just as they apply in Wa. This does not mean that everyone in Wd abides by this social and ethical norm, merely that the norm exists in society. Usually, worlds such as Wd are logically possible. 

Five: Possible Worlds as a Philosophical Tool in Ethics

Smith, I think, rightly argues that “the contemplation of possible worlds is an essential part of ethical theorising”[xxxix] as can be seen by the topic of moral deliberation. It is worth bearing in mind that, when it comes to ethical debates (irrespective of metaphysical and ontological concerns about what a possible world is and how it exists) it is impractical to speak as though all possible worlds are actual without also accepting the notion of possibility[xl]. I agree with Smith when he maintains that morally possible worlds are presupposed and even required in order to engage in ethical thought and to convey ethical concepts and arguments in speech[xli]. I think Smith’s summary (of Borge’s view that people tend to engage in possible worlds thinking when forming intentions, trying to plan and act in the world[xlii]) reflects the dialogue and rhetoric found in Cavendish’s Orations and Bell in Campo. Much of the ethical, and indeed political and feminist arguments Cavendish makes in these texts and others, are revealed through discussions around what to do next, how to deal with a situation or war, or how people or soldiers should execute their plan of action. This often involves weighing up the options, or imagined possible worlds, to work through their ethical societal and political deliberations and values. Making use of the imaginary in no way hinders a possible worlds approach, even today. Smith captures this excellently when he points out, contra Dancy, that imaginary scenarios prompt possible worlds “analysis”[xliii]. Moreover, I agree with Smith there is great value in “intending to construct a possible world that potentially throws light on the actual world in a morally illuminating fashion”[xliv]. This, I think, fits Cavendish’s philosophy perfectly – her possible worlds are not just exploratory, they inform us about sexism, morality, politics and society in our actual world, in an enlightening way.

This style Cavendish adopts, I think, also highlights that, unlike in metaphysics for instance, there is often a gap between what ought to happen and what does happen. Just because something is immoral or amoral, it does not follow that it never happens in the (actual) world[xlv]. Therefore, another advantage of possible worlds thinking in ethics is that, according to Smith, it assists a philosopher to either disprove or assent to a purported ethical theory or argument[xlvi]. Indeed, Smith is not alone in this approach. He cites Lackey as also, contra Dancy, arguing that “moral theorists should consider fictional counterexamples”[xlvii]. Smith merely points out how, when applying possible worlds to ethics, one needs to be careful about actuality[xlviii]. Indeed, Smith claims that modality is indispensable to moral philosophy, as are possible worlds because it enables “ethical deliberation and argument in the first place” and “may secure the possibility of moral philosophy”[xlix]. I suggest that Cavendish shares this line of approach by using possible worlds as a way of deliberating and constructing ethical arguments. This is incredibly ahead for her era. There still is not much scholarship on this approach to ethics in the 21^st century. So for Cavendish, writing in the 17^th century, to be expounding on and showing examples of how to debate ethics and society using possible worlds is amazingly philosophically advanced and contemporary. 

To conclude:

Much as these are mainly contemporary philosophical concepts and terms, I shall be applying these to Cavendish’s Early Modern practical and feminist philosophy. I shall do this by adapting these concepts of modality (namely what is and isn’t possible, necessary or contingent) where needed. This is to clearly and understandably show the technical underpinning and possible methodology behind Cavendish’s philosophy by somewhat bridging the gap between the 17^th and 20^th -21^st centuries as well as bridging any huge subject differences, by adapting the application of these concepts. Later, I shall examine some of Cavendish’s works in turn by providing a textual analysis of where these possible world concepts and terms provide a logical framework for interpreting Cavendish’s philosophy.

 

 

 

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[i] Liba Kaucky, Research Thoughts on...Lady Mary Shepherd, 1st ed., vol. 1, Research Thoughts On... 2 (United Kingdom: blog ebook on Blogger.com, 2018), https://theladymaryshepherdphilosophysalon.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/my-blog-ebook-research-thoughts-on-lady.html.

[ii] John Divers, Possible Worlds, Reprint, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2005).

[iii] Divers, 16.

[iv] Divers, 21–22.

[v] Divers, 21–22.

[vi] Divers, 21–22.

[vii] Divers, 21–22.

[viii] Divers, 21–22.

[ix] Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, Possible Worlds: An Introduction to Logic and Its Philosophy (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1979), xv.

[x] Bradley and Swartz, xv.

[xi] Bradley and Swartz, 63.

[xii] Bradley and Swartz, 63.

[xiii] Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, USA: Blackwell Publishers, 2010), 15.

[xiv] Kripke, 16.

[xv] Kripke, 16–18.

[xvi] Kripke, 16–18.

[xvii] Bradley and Swartz, Possible Worlds, 6.

[xviii] Divers, Possible Worlds, 179.

[xix] Divers, 178.

[xx] Divers, 179.

[xxi] Divers, 179.

[xxii] Divers, 179.

[xxiii] David Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’, in Arguing about Metaphysics, ed. Michael C. Rea, Arguing about Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2009), 78–93.

[xxiv] Lewis.

[xxv] Lewis.

[xxvi] Lewis, 79.

[xxvii] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.

[xxviii] Lewis, 78.

[xxix] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.

[xxx] Lewis, 81.

[xxxi] Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’.

[xxxii] Lewis, 82.

[xxxiii] Lewis, 82.

[xxxiv] Lewis, 85.

[xxxv] Divers, Possible Worlds, 4.

[xxxvi] Divers, 7.

[xxxvii] Divers, 7.

[xxxviii] Divers, Possible Worlds.

[xxxix] Benedict Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’, Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy XX, no. 3 (2001): 41.

[xl] Smith, 46.

[xli] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’.

[xlii] Smith, 43.

[xliii] Smith, 47.

[xliv] Smith, 47.

[xlv] Divers, Possible Worlds, 6.

[xlvi] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’, 47.

[xlvii] Smith, 48.

[xlviii] Smith, ‘Possible Worlds and Moral Philosophy’.

[xlix] Smith, 49.